27 April 2008

borges & infinite monkeys

there's an interesting possibility in the field of literature that can be approached through at least two different philosophical lenses. first, let me explain the possibility, then i'll talk about two immediate problems that arise from it.

the problem i'm going to talk about is the problem of the infinite monkeys. if a group of an infinite amount of monkeys sit on typewriters randomly smacking the keyboards, eventually, all known literary works (and all future ones too) will be produced.

the same intuition is elucidated in a story by borges about an infinite library that has every combination of characters and punctuation marks possible.

from these speculations i see two philosophically interesting questions arising. the first is mostly metaphysical: what ontological status, if any, should we give to stories when, if we take this possibility seriously, all coherent works in the literature already exist in some sense or another?

the second question that arises immediately is one from authorial intent and meaning, thus becoming a question in the philosophy of language. does the intent of the author really add anything to the work produced, given that an unintelligent mechanisms could produce the same works?

these two questions require a lot of thought, but my very preliminary answers depend heavily on the plausibility of the hypothetical. obviously infinite monkeys wouldn't do the trick, but even a computer that does this task forever wouldn't have the time to contain ALL possible works of literature, considering that the human mind's language abilities are infinitely generative. take, for example, simon roberts's book titled knickers, which was unique in that chapter fourteen only says the word "thanks". chapter fourteen, btw, is from page 52 to page 2069. would a computer do that? i don't know.

if my intuition is correct, the role of authorial intent becomes of hightened importance. however, i don't think it has any effect on the ontological question.

18 April 2008

beer tastings part 1

first try
sam adams boston lager*
guinness extra stout*
killians*
sierra nevada pale ale

getting used to it
young's double chocolate stout**
murphy's red beer
pillsner urquell*
stella artois

sam adams night
sam adams brown ale
sam adams scotch ale*
sam adams black lager
sam adams honey porter**

beerapalooza 4
czechvar
hoegaarden***
sam adams irish red
sierra nevada porter

(tentative) beerapalooza finals
young's double chocolate stout
hoegaarden
sam adams honey porter
sam adams boston lager
...

10 April 2008

ppi 3

time for another post on possible post/paper ideas

  • standardized measurement. what kind of metaphysical properties do standardized measurements have? is a meter stick a meter long? what kind of symbol does 'yard' entail? what about yardsticks? in these matters i'll be consulting kripke's "wittgenstien on rules and private language", wittgenstein's "philosophical investigations" and peirce's collected papers. (tags: philosophy, metaphysics, language, wittgenstein, peirce).
  • objecthood and neo-meinongianism. is it plausible to posit non-existent objects in order to solve certain linguistic puzzles? that's to say, "unicorns have one horn" and "unicorns do not exist" are both true sentences? but even if we do this, it seems that we then have to turn to the problem of objecthood. is there a to clearly define some necessary and sufficient conditions for what it takes to be an object? and if so, what are they? or what might they look like? and what do do with this apparently adverse reaction from people with metaphysical distrust? (tags: philosophy, metaphysics, metaontology, language).
  • evolutionary ethics. i should write a post in the metaethical strain as i did once and begin to lay some groundwork for an evolutionary constructive ethics. (tags: philosophy, metaethics, ethics).
  • ethics case studies. i've been thinking about evaluating certain issues in terms of their ethical consequences. case studies might include plagiarism and/or intellectual copyright, sports and/or steroid use, etc. (tags: ethics, applied).
  • existence as property. this post, if distinct from the neo-meinongianism post, would be very similar. but this post or paper would be evaluating the strictly logical thesis of getting rid of existence as an quantifier in first order logic. existence would instead be just another property. how feasible is this, and how much logic can stand without it? what, if anything, would go in its place? this post is very related to non-existent objects "being". and could branch out to very similar topics in reference and even modality (what if referring to non-existence objects is really referring to objects in other dimensions a la lewis?) (tags: logic, philosophy, language, metaphysics, metalogic, metaontology)

metametametametameta...

there's a specter haunting philosophy:

the specter of reaching inconceivable levels of meta.

the worst part: i'm not helping.

not too long ago i attended a lecture by colin mcginn titled "on the possibility of ontology." his main point was that there is no need to reduce from any of the three traditional ontological categories (i.e. physical, mental, abstract) to any other, mainly because none of the ontological categories are well-defined (or definable) anyway. so mcginn pretty much said let's leave things that "are" as just "being" and accept many things as just plain "being". that's to say: chairs are, just as beliefs are and numbers are. he dubbed this view ontological pluralism.

this position leaves some questions unclear (is this really ontological pluralism? isn't this an argument for ontological category-eliminitavism?), but in the spirit of this post, i'll leave them aside for now.

what bothers me is that, in having ontology the topic of discussion, we are engaging in the the practice of metametaphysics, as ontology is a part of metaphysics; or others have dubbed it metaontology (which 3 out of 3 surveyed found a more pleasing term). anyway, these metaontological talks have already spawned discussions about the plausibility of engaging in in such metaontological discussions, deeming them to be meaningless banter, a sort of psychobabble. this opinion, of course, spontaneously generated metametaontology, or even worse, metametametaphysics.

and i'm making all things worse because whatever level of meta these ontologists achieve, i'll always be, a fortiori one step more meta.

i guess my worry and my reason for this post is this basic pondering: are claims of this nature truth-conditional? are we even still worried about the truth at this level of meta?