or, contemporary myths in physicalism
dare i suggest that there is a vagueness in what, exactly, is implied in the concept or ontological category of the "physical". our everyday definition of a physical object is something that you can bump your head against. yet it seems that even the most innocent of everyday, physical things are pseudophysical in that they are also at least in some bit abstract. also, some processes of these physical objects get lumped into the physicalist account. does this move the discussion from physical objects to.. well something else?
all in all, there are some specific cases i have in mind...where the vagueness of the category is painfully apparent. here are three scientific examples.
________________________
1. fields - our best physics posits the existence of fields, not only as necessary objects in the universe (as, say, scientists might posit numbers and theories) but also as strictly physical objects. handydandy wikipedia says that a field is 'the presence of a physical quantity at every point in spacetime.' hm.. something should ring a bell already as the definition seemed a bit off. the field clearly isn't made up of whatever the most minute particle might be, just as i am or stars are. no, fields seem to be not physical objects themselves but the position, behavior, and propensity for specific physical objects as they pass along specific regions of spacetime. does this add up to a physical object? well no, it's not a physical object and it isn't even made up OF physical objects. so, if even in our most sacred science there are objects that are straddling the line ontologically, what can we expect in other fields?
2. mental states - no doubt our brains have a lot to do with our mental states. so much so, of course, that when our brain ceases to function correctly our mental states cease to function accordingly, ad empirically demonstrated in brain damage studies. but, as some people have asked before me i'm sure, are brain states the same as mental states? is there an identity relationship be tween these two characterizations of whatever it is that's going on inside my head? I think kripke's argument is very powerful... take a look at it and see for yourself.
N= necessarily
P = possibly
(a) N (heat = molecular motion).
this is a necessary a posteriori truth. is it possible to have heat without molecular motion? well no. no matter what, if it's heat, it's caused by molecular motion. sure, there might be sensations of heat without molecular motion. but if it's real heat, it's real molecular motion. now, can we say
(b) ? N (pain = c-fibers firing)
well let's put the identity to the test just like last time. is it possible to have the sensation of pain without it being pain? well it seems like the answer is pretty obvious, NO! if you feel pain you have pain! this calls into question whether c-fibres firing just IS pain. once again, this either means that definition of pain provided by the best anatomical science is incomplete (and it doesn't seem to be, at least here on earth), or that pain just is not the same as c-fibers firing, leaving us with
(c) ~N(pain = c-fibers firing)
rounding out the discussion on physical objects, and brain states, where does this leave us? well it leaves us in a more primitively intuitive position where we think that the brain and its states (physical objects) sure do have a lot to do with our minds (presumably other than physical objects) yet they aren't the same thing. so things like belief, pain, fear, etc are partially physical.
3. species - reading fodor's critique of natural selection has got me thinking a lot about philosophy of biology lately. one of things i've come to believe is that talk of species and groups of animals with similar properties and so forth isn't strictly speaking physical. of course, this comes of no surprise to anyone who's familiar with set theory or even mereology. anyway, the abstractions we can assign to the physical characteristics of individual animals across similar-enough genetic liniage definitely makes the concept of 'species' an ontologically dualist one.
__________________________
well then, what do these suggestions do, if anything? i think it does two things. first, it reinforces the insight mcginn had in saying that ontological categories are oftentimes ill-defined. in these three cases i have given examples with a focus on the vagueness of the 'physical' category, but in doing so i've also muddled up 'abstract' and 'mental'.
a further, more powerful consequence of establishing these marginally physical objects is the clear rejection of ontological physicalism. If there is someone who wholds that what there is is physical and that's all there is, yet what's physical can't be said to be always physical, then physicalism is false.
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
28 April 2008
ontological agnosticism
given that ontological categories are not determinate, or at least not rigorous enough for us to give clear and mutually exclusive definitions of them (is a magnetic field material? are numbers purely abstract? does 'belief' transcend the mind/body dualism?), is it possible to formulate a metaontological position that defends an agnostic outlook?
allow me to clarify... some metaphysicians declare that material objects are the only kind of object. others allow for certain abstracta, but not all (such as quine and his acceptance of numbers and sets). others also infamously allow for many kinds of abstract objects and physical objects, but no mental (popper). others still barely mention the abstract or reduce it to the mental (descartes). but not many of these people give justifications for not only their ontology, but their procedures for determining their ontology.
notable exceptions include quine, who said that numbers are real because they are necessary for science to work, and carnap, who said that our ontological decisions depend heavily on a non-rigorous selection of a 'framework' which we work within. this debate in the 1950s set up the more modern field of metaontology, who have a generally positive realist camp inspired by quine, and a generally negative anti-realist camp inspired by carnap.
contemporary names in these debates include peter van inwagen (notre dame) , david chalmers (anu), amie thomasson (miami), steve yablo (mit), ted sider (nyu), and some others. there are the what some people call "hard" realists, who say that these questions are answerable and significant, there are "soft" realists who say that these questions are answerable yet trivial or unimportant, and there is only one distinguishable camp of anti-realists who deny the answerability of these questions completely.
however, shouldn't there be a middle ground position? perhaps a deflationary position that says the entire debate is shoddy, or that the questions themselves don't make any more sense? this i would characterize as a deflationary metaontology.
further, is also a position available closely akin to the position mcginn holds in mind debates: we aren't in a position to know the answers to these questions. we are epistemically handicapped in these matters. this view would be an ontological agnosticism.
[this last section is very speculative] perhaps this is why mcginn holds a view he calls 'ontological pluralism'. he sees that metaontological debates are unanswerable, he supposes that we just roll with the ontological categories we already work with: categories ranging through everyday experience: books, chairs, thoughts, beliefs, etc.
allow me to clarify... some metaphysicians declare that material objects are the only kind of object. others allow for certain abstracta, but not all (such as quine and his acceptance of numbers and sets). others also infamously allow for many kinds of abstract objects and physical objects, but no mental (popper). others still barely mention the abstract or reduce it to the mental (descartes). but not many of these people give justifications for not only their ontology, but their procedures for determining their ontology.
notable exceptions include quine, who said that numbers are real because they are necessary for science to work, and carnap, who said that our ontological decisions depend heavily on a non-rigorous selection of a 'framework' which we work within. this debate in the 1950s set up the more modern field of metaontology, who have a generally positive realist camp inspired by quine, and a generally negative anti-realist camp inspired by carnap.
contemporary names in these debates include peter van inwagen (notre dame) , david chalmers (anu), amie thomasson (miami), steve yablo (mit), ted sider (nyu), and some others. there are the what some people call "hard" realists, who say that these questions are answerable and significant, there are "soft" realists who say that these questions are answerable yet trivial or unimportant, and there is only one distinguishable camp of anti-realists who deny the answerability of these questions completely.
however, shouldn't there be a middle ground position? perhaps a deflationary position that says the entire debate is shoddy, or that the questions themselves don't make any more sense? this i would characterize as a deflationary metaontology.
further, is also a position available closely akin to the position mcginn holds in mind debates: we aren't in a position to know the answers to these questions. we are epistemically handicapped in these matters. this view would be an ontological agnosticism.
[this last section is very speculative] perhaps this is why mcginn holds a view he calls 'ontological pluralism'. he sees that metaontological debates are unanswerable, he supposes that we just roll with the ontological categories we already work with: categories ranging through everyday experience: books, chairs, thoughts, beliefs, etc.
27 April 2008
philosophy as conceptual lexicography
definition of (analytic, or, proper) philosophy:
Philosophy (n) to engage in the activity of conceptual lexicography, id est, the clarifying of conceptual muddles.
Philosophy (n) to engage in the activity of conceptual lexicography, id est, the clarifying of conceptual muddles.
mind-body dualisms
i've become increasingly convinced that reductionist materialist explanations of consciousness are inadequate. this doesn't completely put me in the cartesian camp, but i wanted to make a brief post exploring some of the options available, from least to most ontologically pluralistic.
1. Predicate Dualism - perhaps there is oen ontological category, presumably materialism, which can be characterized only through the introduction of two predicate categories. this is not to imply that these predicates correspond to different properties. these predicates are just different ways to "look at" or "talk about" one thing with really one set of properties. so "mental states" and "physical states" can still be talked about, with only one substance and one set of properties. this view is usually appealed to in lieu of reductive materialism because the reductive accounts leave explanatory gaps. fodor holds this view.
2. Property Dualism - similar, perhaps, to predicate dualism, except acknowledging that the different predicates actually do refer to different properties that one substance has. so it's still the one (once again, presumably material) thing having two levels of properties. these two types of properties are usually described as differences of process. just as the stomach is used for digestion, the brain is used for cognition. even though he tends to deny it, it seems as though this is the view searle holds. nagel holds it too.
3. Substance Dualism - then of course there's good ol' fashioned cartesianism, where the mind and the body are wholly different things. there are (at least) two different ontological categories, thus explaining succinctly and intuitively the nature of the discrepancies between the properties ascribed to mental and physical events. a contemporary proponent of this view is david chalmers.
4. Mental Agnosticism (mysterianism) - i was at first tempted to lump mysterianism along with the substance dualists, but that would be unfair. mysterians are ultimately agnostics about this kind of thing, holding that the cognitive power of the human will leave this question unanswered. we're just not smart enough to know exactly what's going on in our minds, just as chimps are just too dumb to master calculus. this is the position that mcginn holds.
the easiest out is by far the third option. it is the most intuitive and the most explanatory. however, most people nowadays don't give it much of a chance because of the heavily materialist conception of the world we live in today. personally i don't see what the big deal is to posti necessary ontological categories if we have good reason to think they're necessary. however, i can see where they're coming from as i was a strict reductive materialist until recently. over the summer i'm going to read some canonical texts in each type of dualism so i can choose which one i find most reasonable, and which is closest to experience. but before i read any of the texts, let me say that i think the most reasonable position to take, at least prima facie, is the fourth option, #4. the hard problem, as chalmers put it, really is very hard. and there doesn't seem to be a straightforward answer to it in sight.
1. Predicate Dualism - perhaps there is oen ontological category, presumably materialism, which can be characterized only through the introduction of two predicate categories. this is not to imply that these predicates correspond to different properties. these predicates are just different ways to "look at" or "talk about" one thing with really one set of properties. so "mental states" and "physical states" can still be talked about, with only one substance and one set of properties. this view is usually appealed to in lieu of reductive materialism because the reductive accounts leave explanatory gaps. fodor holds this view.
2. Property Dualism - similar, perhaps, to predicate dualism, except acknowledging that the different predicates actually do refer to different properties that one substance has. so it's still the one (once again, presumably material) thing having two levels of properties. these two types of properties are usually described as differences of process. just as the stomach is used for digestion, the brain is used for cognition. even though he tends to deny it, it seems as though this is the view searle holds. nagel holds it too.
3. Substance Dualism - then of course there's good ol' fashioned cartesianism, where the mind and the body are wholly different things. there are (at least) two different ontological categories, thus explaining succinctly and intuitively the nature of the discrepancies between the properties ascribed to mental and physical events. a contemporary proponent of this view is david chalmers.
4. Mental Agnosticism (mysterianism) - i was at first tempted to lump mysterianism along with the substance dualists, but that would be unfair. mysterians are ultimately agnostics about this kind of thing, holding that the cognitive power of the human will leave this question unanswered. we're just not smart enough to know exactly what's going on in our minds, just as chimps are just too dumb to master calculus. this is the position that mcginn holds.
the easiest out is by far the third option. it is the most intuitive and the most explanatory. however, most people nowadays don't give it much of a chance because of the heavily materialist conception of the world we live in today. personally i don't see what the big deal is to posti necessary ontological categories if we have good reason to think they're necessary. however, i can see where they're coming from as i was a strict reductive materialist until recently. over the summer i'm going to read some canonical texts in each type of dualism so i can choose which one i find most reasonable, and which is closest to experience. but before i read any of the texts, let me say that i think the most reasonable position to take, at least prima facie, is the fourth option, #4. the hard problem, as chalmers put it, really is very hard. and there doesn't seem to be a straightforward answer to it in sight.
borges & infinite monkeys
there's an interesting possibility in the field of literature that can be approached through at least two different philosophical lenses. first, let me explain the possibility, then i'll talk about two immediate problems that arise from it.
the problem i'm going to talk about is the problem of the infinite monkeys. if a group of an infinite amount of monkeys sit on typewriters randomly smacking the keyboards, eventually, all known literary works (and all future ones too) will be produced.
the same intuition is elucidated in a story by borges about an infinite library that has every combination of characters and punctuation marks possible.
from these speculations i see two philosophically interesting questions arising. the first is mostly metaphysical: what ontological status, if any, should we give to stories when, if we take this possibility seriously, all coherent works in the literature already exist in some sense or another?
the second question that arises immediately is one from authorial intent and meaning, thus becoming a question in the philosophy of language. does the intent of the author really add anything to the work produced, given that an unintelligent mechanisms could produce the same works?
these two questions require a lot of thought, but my very preliminary answers depend heavily on the plausibility of the hypothetical. obviously infinite monkeys wouldn't do the trick, but even a computer that does this task forever wouldn't have the time to contain ALL possible works of literature, considering that the human mind's language abilities are infinitely generative. take, for example, simon roberts's book titled knickers, which was unique in that chapter fourteen only says the word "thanks". chapter fourteen, btw, is from page 52 to page 2069. would a computer do that? i don't know.
if my intuition is correct, the role of authorial intent becomes of hightened importance. however, i don't think it has any effect on the ontological question.
the problem i'm going to talk about is the problem of the infinite monkeys. if a group of an infinite amount of monkeys sit on typewriters randomly smacking the keyboards, eventually, all known literary works (and all future ones too) will be produced.
the same intuition is elucidated in a story by borges about an infinite library that has every combination of characters and punctuation marks possible.
from these speculations i see two philosophically interesting questions arising. the first is mostly metaphysical: what ontological status, if any, should we give to stories when, if we take this possibility seriously, all coherent works in the literature already exist in some sense or another?
the second question that arises immediately is one from authorial intent and meaning, thus becoming a question in the philosophy of language. does the intent of the author really add anything to the work produced, given that an unintelligent mechanisms could produce the same works?
these two questions require a lot of thought, but my very preliminary answers depend heavily on the plausibility of the hypothetical. obviously infinite monkeys wouldn't do the trick, but even a computer that does this task forever wouldn't have the time to contain ALL possible works of literature, considering that the human mind's language abilities are infinitely generative. take, for example, simon roberts's book titled knickers, which was unique in that chapter fourteen only says the word "thanks". chapter fourteen, btw, is from page 52 to page 2069. would a computer do that? i don't know.
if my intuition is correct, the role of authorial intent becomes of hightened importance. however, i don't think it has any effect on the ontological question.
10 April 2008
ppi 3
time for another post on possible post/paper ideas
- standardized measurement. what kind of metaphysical properties do standardized measurements have? is a meter stick a meter long? what kind of symbol does 'yard' entail? what about yardsticks? in these matters i'll be consulting kripke's "wittgenstien on rules and private language", wittgenstein's "philosophical investigations" and peirce's collected papers. (tags: philosophy, metaphysics, language, wittgenstein, peirce).
- objecthood and neo-meinongianism. is it plausible to posit non-existent objects in order to solve certain linguistic puzzles? that's to say, "unicorns have one horn" and "unicorns do not exist" are both true sentences? but even if we do this, it seems that we then have to turn to the problem of objecthood. is there a to clearly define some necessary and sufficient conditions for what it takes to be an object? and if so, what are they? or what might they look like? and what do do with this apparently adverse reaction from people with metaphysical distrust? (tags: philosophy, metaphysics, metaontology, language).
- evolutionary ethics. i should write a post in the metaethical strain as i did once and begin to lay some groundwork for an evolutionary constructive ethics. (tags: philosophy, metaethics, ethics).
- ethics case studies. i've been thinking about evaluating certain issues in terms of their ethical consequences. case studies might include plagiarism and/or intellectual copyright, sports and/or steroid use, etc. (tags: ethics, applied).
- existence as property. this post, if distinct from the neo-meinongianism post, would be very similar. but this post or paper would be evaluating the strictly logical thesis of getting rid of existence as an quantifier in first order logic. existence would instead be just another property. how feasible is this, and how much logic can stand without it? what, if anything, would go in its place? this post is very related to non-existent objects "being". and could branch out to very similar topics in reference and even modality (what if referring to non-existence objects is really referring to objects in other dimensions a la lewis?) (tags: logic, philosophy, language, metaphysics, metalogic, metaontology)
metametametametameta...
there's a specter haunting philosophy:
the specter of reaching inconceivable levels of meta.
the worst part: i'm not helping.
not too long ago i attended a lecture by colin mcginn titled "on the possibility of ontology." his main point was that there is no need to reduce from any of the three traditional ontological categories (i.e. physical, mental, abstract) to any other, mainly because none of the ontological categories are well-defined (or definable) anyway. so mcginn pretty much said let's leave things that "are" as just "being" and accept many things as just plain "being". that's to say: chairs are, just as beliefs are and numbers are. he dubbed this view ontological pluralism.
this position leaves some questions unclear (is this really ontological pluralism? isn't this an argument for ontological category-eliminitavism?), but in the spirit of this post, i'll leave them aside for now.
what bothers me is that, in having ontology the topic of discussion, we are engaging in the the practice of metametaphysics, as ontology is a part of metaphysics; or others have dubbed it metaontology (which 3 out of 3 surveyed found a more pleasing term). anyway, these metaontological talks have already spawned discussions about the plausibility of engaging in in such metaontological discussions, deeming them to be meaningless banter, a sort of psychobabble. this opinion, of course, spontaneously generated metametaontology, or even worse, metametametaphysics.
and i'm making all things worse because whatever level of meta these ontologists achieve, i'll always be, a fortiori one step more meta.
i guess my worry and my reason for this post is this basic pondering: are claims of this nature truth-conditional? are we even still worried about the truth at this level of meta?
the specter of reaching inconceivable levels of meta.
the worst part: i'm not helping.
not too long ago i attended a lecture by colin mcginn titled "on the possibility of ontology." his main point was that there is no need to reduce from any of the three traditional ontological categories (i.e. physical, mental, abstract) to any other, mainly because none of the ontological categories are well-defined (or definable) anyway. so mcginn pretty much said let's leave things that "are" as just "being" and accept many things as just plain "being". that's to say: chairs are, just as beliefs are and numbers are. he dubbed this view ontological pluralism.
this position leaves some questions unclear (is this really ontological pluralism? isn't this an argument for ontological category-eliminitavism?), but in the spirit of this post, i'll leave them aside for now.
what bothers me is that, in having ontology the topic of discussion, we are engaging in the the practice of metametaphysics, as ontology is a part of metaphysics; or others have dubbed it metaontology (which 3 out of 3 surveyed found a more pleasing term). anyway, these metaontological talks have already spawned discussions about the plausibility of engaging in in such metaontological discussions, deeming them to be meaningless banter, a sort of psychobabble. this opinion, of course, spontaneously generated metametaontology, or even worse, metametametaphysics.
and i'm making all things worse because whatever level of meta these ontologists achieve, i'll always be, a fortiori one step more meta.
i guess my worry and my reason for this post is this basic pondering: are claims of this nature truth-conditional? are we even still worried about the truth at this level of meta?
09 April 2008
shortlist
ignore.
terminal programs
miami
indiana-boomington
umass-amherst
cuny
yale
usc
st andrews
cornell
brown
unc-chapel hill
ucla
mit
pittsburgh
princeton
cambridge (mlitt/phd)
rutgers
non-terminal programs
houston
tufts
oxford (bphil)
terminal programs
miami
indiana-boomington
umass-amherst
cuny
yale
usc
st andrews
cornell
brown
unc-chapel hill
ucla
mit
pittsburgh
princeton
cambridge (mlitt/phd)
rutgers
non-terminal programs
houston
tufts
oxford (bphil)
08 April 2008
socrates's defense
did socrates even really try?
i mean as he is attempting to defend himself from anytus and meletus, socrates barely makes a convincing case in his own favor, and instead turns the conversation around against the meletus and accuses him of the same things he's been accused of. he doesn't give a consistent account of his own life (was he or was he not a philosopher before his friend went to go see the oracle?)
anyway, after he gets found guilty, why does he seemingly taunt the jury by suggesting his punishment should be banquets in his honor? withouth a doubt this guy was influential and lived up to very rigorous ethicals tandards, but he also should have been smart enough to save his own skin!
i mean as he is attempting to defend himself from anytus and meletus, socrates barely makes a convincing case in his own favor, and instead turns the conversation around against the meletus and accuses him of the same things he's been accused of. he doesn't give a consistent account of his own life (was he or was he not a philosopher before his friend went to go see the oracle?)
anyway, after he gets found guilty, why does he seemingly taunt the jury by suggesting his punishment should be banquets in his honor? withouth a doubt this guy was influential and lived up to very rigorous ethicals tandards, but he also should have been smart enough to save his own skin!
07 April 2008
musical meaning
what is it in a song that has the ability to bring out meaning to its listener? is there anything in the song itself that has these properties, or is it all in the mind? i don't know if it's because i'm feeling particularly emo today, but i was listening to miles davis's classic ballad "blue in green". for the purposes of the post, listen to this one, at least in part:
all music is, at least if given a materialist ontology, is a series of noises of different frequencies arranged in a particular way in space-time. but then how is it that these noises carry what we each understand to have meaning of some sort? is this meaning external or internal? or some combination of both? i guess here i'm drawing a parralel to the philosophy of language. i suspect some answer to this can be arrived at if we take some ideas from frege. however, even this approach would be highly problematicc.
in frege's discussion of language, there are generally two aspects to names: their sense (the cognitive associations and dimensions of the name) and their reference (what those names actually refer to). but of course it isn't obvious that music refers to anything at all.
i'm honestly not in the mood for even trying to solve this puzzle right now, but i hope i have the effort to one day tackle this issue with the seriousness it deserves.
all music is, at least if given a materialist ontology, is a series of noises of different frequencies arranged in a particular way in space-time. but then how is it that these noises carry what we each understand to have meaning of some sort? is this meaning external or internal? or some combination of both? i guess here i'm drawing a parralel to the philosophy of language. i suspect some answer to this can be arrived at if we take some ideas from frege. however, even this approach would be highly problematicc.
in frege's discussion of language, there are generally two aspects to names: their sense (the cognitive associations and dimensions of the name) and their reference (what those names actually refer to). but of course it isn't obvious that music refers to anything at all.
i'm honestly not in the mood for even trying to solve this puzzle right now, but i hope i have the effort to one day tackle this issue with the seriousness it deserves.
04 April 2008
rabbits in the literature
is there any interesting connection between rabbits and 20th century analytic philosophy? obviously not, but i've found 2 interesting examples of philosophy and rabbits entering the same discussion:
quine's "lo, gavagai!"- the infamous thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. here's the situation: an anthropo-linguist is placed in a foreign land with some indigenous people speaking a language he has no remote clue about. they happen to find themselves in a field. the indigenous people point in a particular direction and exclaim "Lo, gavagai!" the linguist looks towards where they're gesturing, and he sees a rabbit. does this mean the indigenous people were talking about rabbits? or were they saying 'there goes dinner'? or maybe 'the village will have good luck this year'? well quine's idea is that there is no way to know what they were talking about. it's an epistemological point, from what i can tell.
wittgenstein's "duck-rabbit" - this example of wittgenstein, used to illustrate the difference between seeing AS and seeing THAT, is so famous a brewery is named in its honor. his main philosophical point was that there are some ambiguous symbols, and images, and in these cases (which are more commonplace than one might think), we have to see "as", meaning our own perceptions are necessarily imbued with personal concepts and whims. hopefully i didn't get wittgenstein TOO horribly bad in this brief characterization, although i probably did.
quine's "lo, gavagai!"- the infamous thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. here's the situation: an anthropo-linguist is placed in a foreign land with some indigenous people speaking a language he has no remote clue about. they happen to find themselves in a field. the indigenous people point in a particular direction and exclaim "Lo, gavagai!" the linguist looks towards where they're gesturing, and he sees a rabbit. does this mean the indigenous people were talking about rabbits? or were they saying 'there goes dinner'? or maybe 'the village will have good luck this year'? well quine's idea is that there is no way to know what they were talking about. it's an epistemological point, from what i can tell.
wittgenstein's "duck-rabbit" - this example of wittgenstein, used to illustrate the difference between seeing AS and seeing THAT, is so famous a brewery is named in its honor. his main philosophical point was that there are some ambiguous symbols, and images, and in these cases (which are more commonplace than one might think), we have to see "as", meaning our own perceptions are necessarily imbued with personal concepts and whims. hopefully i didn't get wittgenstein TOO horribly bad in this brief characterization, although i probably did.
03 April 2008
on the ethics of discourse
(for the purposes of this post, i will be using a very primitive notion of right and wrong)
how okay is it to use as much rhetoric, outside of logic, in order to argue for something in the course of some discourse?
my gut reaction is to say that it's not okay at all. but there seems to be a very big difference, though, if you consider certain types of rhetorical devices (mostly the aesthetically inclined ones) than if you consider certain rhetorical methods that directly contradict logic (affirming the consequent, or whatever.)
let's take some concrete examples. using anaphora is a well known method for capturing the attention of the audience, especially if spoken. This seems harmless, and it sure does sound good.
on the other hand, affirming the consequent is a straightforwardly false in deductive logic. and unless used in a provisional and very specifically delineated discussion (where it might be justifiable under the guise of an abductive inference), it would be either a formal fallacy (to some uninformed speaker) or an intentional manipulation (where it would be used as a rhetorical device). either way, some shady stuff is going on and there very clearly see that something bad is going on here.
but even upon reconsideration of the previous example, of the aesthetically-motivated rhetoric, is there more to these devices than meets the eye? could it be that these rhetorical methods are distracting from the point of the message? in some way, is discourse supposed to be just presenting the facts in a logical manner without the hooplah and smoke and mirrors that any rhetorical device other than the clear argumentation only cold hard logic can offer?
no way, that can't be right either. i need to unstiffen my requirements for an acceptable discourse, as those aesthetically motivated rhetorical devices add a lot to some speeches, they help deliver the message more than hinder it. such as in dr. king's "i have a dream" speech, which is in english language anthologies nationwide.
could it be that any of these methods are acceptable if the GOAL of the discourse if justified, or in any case "right" by some other standard? this is a question i'll leave for another time
how okay is it to use as much rhetoric, outside of logic, in order to argue for something in the course of some discourse?
my gut reaction is to say that it's not okay at all. but there seems to be a very big difference, though, if you consider certain types of rhetorical devices (mostly the aesthetically inclined ones) than if you consider certain rhetorical methods that directly contradict logic (affirming the consequent, or whatever.)
let's take some concrete examples. using anaphora is a well known method for capturing the attention of the audience, especially if spoken. This seems harmless, and it sure does sound good.
on the other hand, affirming the consequent is a straightforwardly false in deductive logic. and unless used in a provisional and very specifically delineated discussion (where it might be justifiable under the guise of an abductive inference), it would be either a formal fallacy (to some uninformed speaker) or an intentional manipulation (where it would be used as a rhetorical device). either way, some shady stuff is going on and there very clearly see that something bad is going on here.
but even upon reconsideration of the previous example, of the aesthetically-motivated rhetoric, is there more to these devices than meets the eye? could it be that these rhetorical methods are distracting from the point of the message? in some way, is discourse supposed to be just presenting the facts in a logical manner without the hooplah and smoke and mirrors that any rhetorical device other than the clear argumentation only cold hard logic can offer?
no way, that can't be right either. i need to unstiffen my requirements for an acceptable discourse, as those aesthetically motivated rhetorical devices add a lot to some speeches, they help deliver the message more than hinder it. such as in dr. king's "i have a dream" speech, which is in english language anthologies nationwide.
could it be that any of these methods are acceptable if the GOAL of the discourse if justified, or in any case "right" by some other standard? this is a question i'll leave for another time
02 April 2008
sartre's 'existentialism and humanism'
The main ideas of Sartre's philosophy as expressed in "Existentialism and Humanism" can be summed up in a few basic points:
1. "Existence precedes Essence" - which is an ontological claim, that one must exist already in order to investigate the essence of that existence
2. Subject-Relative Constructive Ethics - which is a meta-ethical position, in the sense that it is a claim about ethics as a whole. There is no static, objective ethics to speak of, yet individuals have the power of creating their own ethical standards through their personal investigations of their own essence. And
3. Humanistic Marxism - which is an ethical/political position. Each individual will eventually reach conclusions, through the construction of their own ethics, approaching a humanistic Marxism. That is to say, that their ethical stances will be human-centered and equalitarian.
Each of these positions is causally independent. One can defend any of these three basic points without holding either of the other two; but Sartre combines these three to form the basic tenants of his Existentialist Philosophy. Because they're independent of each other, they can each be critiqued independently. Further, they can be critiqued in relation to each other. What I shall be doing, however, within the limited scope of this paper, is to critique at least a bit each proposition independently. I will leave the problem of their consistency untouched (although I suspect they cohere as well as Sartre would have liked).
1. 1. "Existence precedes Essence" is a quotation of Sartre's that could be taken one of two ways. It is either trivial or false. If by "existence precedes essence" he means that it is necessary for a cognizant person to be alive in order for it to investigate their own essence, then that seems to me to be a trivial point. Of course someone has to have the property of existence in order for them to have any thoughts whatsoever. However, if by this ontological claim he means to say that in order for any human being to have an essence they must first exist, I don't see how this is true. We can figure out the essence of any human being just as we figured out the essence of gold, or the essence of electricity: through scientific investigation. Gold's essence is a substance having the atomic number 79, the essence of electricity is what Einstein figured out, and the essence of Humanity is having 46 chromosomes and the only living members of the Homo genus. So to me this claim is rather nonsensical.
2. 2. Having an ethical system of subject-relative constructive ethics has many potential advantages as well as many drawbacks. If all ethics is is a series of claims reached by each individual through their own constructions, then there is obviously a sense of empowerment that each individual attains. In this sense, Sartre is very similar to Nietzsche, who would have agreed with his vision of individuals creating their own ethics. However, to me this reeks of a self-help manual more than a rigorous examination of what the true meanings of "right" and "wrong" are. IF this is all that ethics boils down to, there are no real truth values to ethical statements, only truth values as assigned by each individual. What then, if anything, do we use as a basis for grounding our morality? Do we use consensus between independently attained ethical propositions held by individuals? But then we slide back into a kind of utilitarianism that I believe Sartre wouldn't agree with either. My point here is that, as of right now, I can't make a decision as to whether I like Sartre's meta-ethics or not, but I feel that this kind of idea might as well be Dr. Phil's.
3. 3.I won't touch the third point.
So where does this leave Sartre? I don't think he's in very good shape if any of my criticisms hold.
externalism in experience/sensations
ok this is going to be really short and i hope to expand on this later, but i was thinking about externalism in sensations. here's my thought: when you feel a pain, where exactly do you feel it? many people have argued that you can only feel pain in your brain. that is, if something pinches you on the hand, you feel the pain in your brain nevertheless because that's where the c-fibers directed.
but, if you realize that each particular pain has an origin, then that origin is necessary and thus, even though the brain registers the pain, it is actually felt whereever it was actually felt.
this intuition is largely caught in a thought experiment that to my knowledge, is new. it is no doubt inspired in part by kripkenstein on other minds and mcginn on imagination, but here goes.
is it possible to imagine a pain in your knee? well, sure, you can imagine your knee being in pain, and in the simulated pain, it is your knee that has the sensation. however, can you imagine a pain in your knee in your elbow? well that doesn't really make sense. you could imagine a pain in your elbow, even a particular type of pain, the same your knee had, on your elbow (sharp vs. chronic, etc), but you can't imagine a pain in your knee in your elbow.
if i'm right about this, then particular pains have necessary origins, which lend support to an externalist account of sensation.
however, an objection quickly arises in the cases of pain in phantom limbs. i either have to come up with a pretty damn good explanation for them, or categorize them as non-legitimate pains. i tend to agree with the latter, but then i'd have o come to the conclusion that sensations of pain are not the same as pain. however, kripke himself has argued for this claim, that sensations of pain ARE pain (and the argument seems to be sound).
how to reconcile my seemingly correct previous intuition with kripke's? this'll take some time to figure out.
but, if you realize that each particular pain has an origin, then that origin is necessary and thus, even though the brain registers the pain, it is actually felt whereever it was actually felt.
this intuition is largely caught in a thought experiment that to my knowledge, is new. it is no doubt inspired in part by kripkenstein on other minds and mcginn on imagination, but here goes.
is it possible to imagine a pain in your knee? well, sure, you can imagine your knee being in pain, and in the simulated pain, it is your knee that has the sensation. however, can you imagine a pain in your knee in your elbow? well that doesn't really make sense. you could imagine a pain in your elbow, even a particular type of pain, the same your knee had, on your elbow (sharp vs. chronic, etc), but you can't imagine a pain in your knee in your elbow.
if i'm right about this, then particular pains have necessary origins, which lend support to an externalist account of sensation.
however, an objection quickly arises in the cases of pain in phantom limbs. i either have to come up with a pretty damn good explanation for them, or categorize them as non-legitimate pains. i tend to agree with the latter, but then i'd have o come to the conclusion that sensations of pain are not the same as pain. however, kripke himself has argued for this claim, that sensations of pain ARE pain (and the argument seems to be sound).
how to reconcile my seemingly correct previous intuition with kripke's? this'll take some time to figure out.
31 March 2008
re: top ten philosophers of all time
found through old wizard is this list of the top ten philosophers of all time. *drumroll please*
10. Rousseau
9. Hume
8. Hegel
7. Heidegger
6. Kierkegaard
5. Kant
4. Descartes
3. Nietzsche
2. Husserl
1. Plato/Socrates
is it just me, or is this list heavily biased towards the continent? it's not that the continental tradition hasn't added somethin to philosophy, but there are some names in there that, although somewhat important, have had their thoughts culminated in the philosophies of others on the list. Say kierkegaard, his thoughts could be expressed mostly by heidegger. same for husserl. Roussaeu was barely a philosopher, more of a political-and-economical theorist in the style of marx. i imagine hegel to be important, so i'd keep him in. nietzsche, on the other hand, was also culminated in heiddeger. and nietzsche was more of a self-help writer anyway. so i'd strike out Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Hursserl, and Nietzsche.
in their places, which would i put in? i'd definitely include wittgenstein, for one. also aristotle. those two for sure. but who else? i'd be inclined to include peirce, probably as a result of my heavy bias in favor of him. but i figure russell might deserve to be in there, also kripke, or even quine, or locke. possibly hobbes or marx. rawls. even sartre. maybe frege, or even foucault. anyway, here's my list.
15. Chomsky
a little out of left field, i know, but his philosophical underpinnings for his linguistics work, combined with his political commentary based in philosophical justifications for a communist anarchism, make him the most cited person alive. he will be read for a long time.
14. Quine
scientistic through and through. his radical empiricism reminds one of hume, but his logical tools and his subject choice of language distinguish him and establish his importance. tried to dissolve the analytic/synthetic distinction.
13. Kripke
an essentialist in the spirit of aristotle, he provided much of the logical structure of modal talk, and his kripke semantics for modal semantics, combined with his influential view of proper names, make him among the best.
12. Peirce
charles peirce, modicum of clear thought, founder of the american school of pragmatism. along with frege invented mathematical logic as we know it today, along with the logic of relations.
11. Russell
wanted to establish the logical basis of mathematics but filed. nevertheless, his political philosophy, his philoophy of language, and his philosophy of mathematics make him virtually unavoidable in philosophy.
10. Sartre
one of the major thinkers in the existentialist schoo l yet wrote a bit more clearly than the rest of them. his interestes were wide and influential, including "meaning", "existence", and various issues in the mind.
9. Frege
revolutionized basic deductive logic and ultimately began the analytic tradition, the "linguistic turn".
8. Hegel
idealist extraordinaire, pretty much started the continental tradition. notorious for being very difficult to read. ontology reserved for ideas.
7. Wittgenstein
i'm pretty sure i should have included wittgenstein twice here, once for the tractatus and once for the investigations. either way, both times he set out to prove that he didn't solve philosophy, he dissolved philosophy. the first, by saying that all philosophical pseudo-problems could be gotten ride of by rigorous logical analysis. the other time by realizing that there are no essences behind words, just uses. very, very influential.
6. Heidegger
extremely rigorous analysis of ontology. i couldn't read him when i tried. but he took ideas from nietzsche, schopenhaur, etc.
5. Kant
one of the first to synthesize the rationalist and empiricist schools. made epistemology respectable. ethics were also highly influential.
4. Hume
very precise philosopher, for the most part. also one of the last great and true skeptics. empiricist to the extreme, made us question our own rationality.
3. Aristotle
hugely influential on all respects. his theory of predicates took the idea from his famous teacher, but made it less creepy. anyway, there are threads of this guy in every other philosopher (except #1 maybe)
2. Descartes
cogito ergo sum
1. Plato/Socrates
the guys who really started it all. forms, justice, love, examined lives, and all that. no need to justify this one, really.
whaatchathiink?
10. Rousseau
9. Hume
8. Hegel
7. Heidegger
6. Kierkegaard
5. Kant
4. Descartes
3. Nietzsche
2. Husserl
1. Plato/Socrates
is it just me, or is this list heavily biased towards the continent? it's not that the continental tradition hasn't added somethin to philosophy, but there are some names in there that, although somewhat important, have had their thoughts culminated in the philosophies of others on the list. Say kierkegaard, his thoughts could be expressed mostly by heidegger. same for husserl. Roussaeu was barely a philosopher, more of a political-and-economical theorist in the style of marx. i imagine hegel to be important, so i'd keep him in. nietzsche, on the other hand, was also culminated in heiddeger. and nietzsche was more of a self-help writer anyway. so i'd strike out Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Hursserl, and Nietzsche.
in their places, which would i put in? i'd definitely include wittgenstein, for one. also aristotle. those two for sure. but who else? i'd be inclined to include peirce, probably as a result of my heavy bias in favor of him. but i figure russell might deserve to be in there, also kripke, or even quine, or locke. possibly hobbes or marx. rawls. even sartre. maybe frege, or even foucault. anyway, here's my list.
15. Chomsky
a little out of left field, i know, but his philosophical underpinnings for his linguistics work, combined with his political commentary based in philosophical justifications for a communist anarchism, make him the most cited person alive. he will be read for a long time.
14. Quine
scientistic through and through. his radical empiricism reminds one of hume, but his logical tools and his subject choice of language distinguish him and establish his importance. tried to dissolve the analytic/synthetic distinction.
13. Kripke
an essentialist in the spirit of aristotle, he provided much of the logical structure of modal talk, and his kripke semantics for modal semantics, combined with his influential view of proper names, make him among the best.
12. Peirce
charles peirce, modicum of clear thought, founder of the american school of pragmatism. along with frege invented mathematical logic as we know it today, along with the logic of relations.
11. Russell
wanted to establish the logical basis of mathematics but filed. nevertheless, his political philosophy, his philoophy of language, and his philosophy of mathematics make him virtually unavoidable in philosophy.
10. Sartre
one of the major thinkers in the existentialist schoo l yet wrote a bit more clearly than the rest of them. his interestes were wide and influential, including "meaning", "existence", and various issues in the mind.
9. Frege
revolutionized basic deductive logic and ultimately began the analytic tradition, the "linguistic turn".
8. Hegel
idealist extraordinaire, pretty much started the continental tradition. notorious for being very difficult to read. ontology reserved for ideas.
7. Wittgenstein
i'm pretty sure i should have included wittgenstein twice here, once for the tractatus and once for the investigations. either way, both times he set out to prove that he didn't solve philosophy, he dissolved philosophy. the first, by saying that all philosophical pseudo-problems could be gotten ride of by rigorous logical analysis. the other time by realizing that there are no essences behind words, just uses. very, very influential.
6. Heidegger
extremely rigorous analysis of ontology. i couldn't read him when i tried. but he took ideas from nietzsche, schopenhaur, etc.
5. Kant
one of the first to synthesize the rationalist and empiricist schools. made epistemology respectable. ethics were also highly influential.
4. Hume
very precise philosopher, for the most part. also one of the last great and true skeptics. empiricist to the extreme, made us question our own rationality.
3. Aristotle
hugely influential on all respects. his theory of predicates took the idea from his famous teacher, but made it less creepy. anyway, there are threads of this guy in every other philosopher (except #1 maybe)
2. Descartes
cogito ergo sum
1. Plato/Socrates
the guys who really started it all. forms, justice, love, examined lives, and all that. no need to justify this one, really.
whaatchathiink?
26 March 2008
nietzsche's superman morality
Nietzsche is a particularly interesting philosopher because, as Russell pointed out, most of the objections that are brought up against his ideas are not rational in nature: that is, they stem from deep seeded “feelings” or other kinds of arguments not based in logical argumentation. However, if there is a way to find counterexamples to his theory without the appeal to feeling, then there might be a way to logically argue against it. I’m going to try to do just that in this brief post.
“A morality of the ruling class applies the principle that one has duties only to one’s equals…”. Here, Nietzsche is summing up a discussion that deals with the distinction of different ethical systems used by individuals in a society. The first system is the one that is constructed by religion and the masses and is what Nietzsche calls the “slave morality”. This system or morality makes individualism and self-interest the “evil”. Further, it makes the interest of the common people the “good”. This system, Nietzsche suggests, was contructed only as a contrast to the “master morality”, the morality used by the success-driven individuals in a society who worry less about popular conceptions of “good” and “evil” and instead look out for whatever they want to. This kind of morality is what drives civilizations forward, Nietzsche believes, and is thus the type of morality everyone should adopt.
Special attention should be payed to the concept of the Master Morality. According to this way morality is construed, what is good to the “overman” is just whatever makes him more powerful, and weakness is what is the “bad”. More and more power will lead the overman to be more happy, and this is how morality should be conceived. There are many ways to attack this kind of reasoning, but some of the ways are limited by our method. Let me show how this is so.
The first way to try to object to these claims is that it just doesn’t seem right. More and more power is not the same as more and more good. These two words designate different things; they’re independent concepts. A Nietzsche-an would quickly retaliate that this is precisely the point he wants to bring forth. That these two concepts are not independent and attempting to make a distinction between them is just a product of our indoctrination to the slave morality. Although this move is kind of shady on the part of the Nietzche-an, Let’s let it slide and explore other routes.
Another way to try to argue against Nietzsche’s Master morality is to try to accept the distinction between the slave and master morality, yet be agnostic about which morality to prefer. After all, the more people follow the slave morality, the more people will live longer and be saved, or so it seems. If more people are looking out for the interest of the group as a whole, then more people will place the interest of their brethren as high as their own and thus people will be more likely to help each other in times of need, when other are attacking, etc. The contrasting morality will also be necessary until a certain extent, but there would be no need for a preference either way. This I feel might be a powerful argument against Nietzsche prioritization of the master morality, as Nietzsche seems to be straddling the line between relativism and objectivity about morality. On the one hand, he says all morality is relative and there is no objective basis of morality. Yet on the other hand, he says master morality is the best morality, the right morality. There May be an implicit contradiction there.
Finally, and on to what I believe to be the most powerful argument against the assimilation of “good” and “power” in Nietzsche’s master morality, is a rather simple argument by consequence. If one person in the “master” morality decides to attain as much power as he could, and then someone else has the same objectives, then it is possible that in gaining more and more “good” one of the individuals annihilates the other. Thus for that person there is no more “good.” The acquirement of power was not in the best interest of the destroyed person, as it led to his death. Of course here the Nietzsche-an could counter-argue and say something like this: “well, that the person died was just evidence of his weakness, not necessarily that power is not good. After all, the person who ended up killing the other guy now has even more power and thus he is even more good.” But would follow with this. If ethics is a relative concept, and the preferred conception of ethics is power=good and weakness=bad, then, to the person who was attempting to attain power and failed, he was in the good yet it led to the worst kind of weakness, death. So maybe, just maybe, looking for more and more power isn’t the same as goodness after all.
Obviously my arguments aren’t very refined yet nor are they knock-down, but at least I think they show that there’s either some inconsistency in the concept of the master morality or that it’s just something that needs to be worked on by Nietzsche followers. (For all I know someone has made these terms clearer but I’m not familiar with more recent literature on the subject.)
“A morality of the ruling class applies the principle that one has duties only to one’s equals…”. Here, Nietzsche is summing up a discussion that deals with the distinction of different ethical systems used by individuals in a society. The first system is the one that is constructed by religion and the masses and is what Nietzsche calls the “slave morality”. This system or morality makes individualism and self-interest the “evil”. Further, it makes the interest of the common people the “good”. This system, Nietzsche suggests, was contructed only as a contrast to the “master morality”, the morality used by the success-driven individuals in a society who worry less about popular conceptions of “good” and “evil” and instead look out for whatever they want to. This kind of morality is what drives civilizations forward, Nietzsche believes, and is thus the type of morality everyone should adopt.
Special attention should be payed to the concept of the Master Morality. According to this way morality is construed, what is good to the “overman” is just whatever makes him more powerful, and weakness is what is the “bad”. More and more power will lead the overman to be more happy, and this is how morality should be conceived. There are many ways to attack this kind of reasoning, but some of the ways are limited by our method. Let me show how this is so.
The first way to try to object to these claims is that it just doesn’t seem right. More and more power is not the same as more and more good. These two words designate different things; they’re independent concepts. A Nietzsche-an would quickly retaliate that this is precisely the point he wants to bring forth. That these two concepts are not independent and attempting to make a distinction between them is just a product of our indoctrination to the slave morality. Although this move is kind of shady on the part of the Nietzche-an, Let’s let it slide and explore other routes.
Another way to try to argue against Nietzsche’s Master morality is to try to accept the distinction between the slave and master morality, yet be agnostic about which morality to prefer. After all, the more people follow the slave morality, the more people will live longer and be saved, or so it seems. If more people are looking out for the interest of the group as a whole, then more people will place the interest of their brethren as high as their own and thus people will be more likely to help each other in times of need, when other are attacking, etc. The contrasting morality will also be necessary until a certain extent, but there would be no need for a preference either way. This I feel might be a powerful argument against Nietzsche prioritization of the master morality, as Nietzsche seems to be straddling the line between relativism and objectivity about morality. On the one hand, he says all morality is relative and there is no objective basis of morality. Yet on the other hand, he says master morality is the best morality, the right morality. There May be an implicit contradiction there.
Finally, and on to what I believe to be the most powerful argument against the assimilation of “good” and “power” in Nietzsche’s master morality, is a rather simple argument by consequence. If one person in the “master” morality decides to attain as much power as he could, and then someone else has the same objectives, then it is possible that in gaining more and more “good” one of the individuals annihilates the other. Thus for that person there is no more “good.” The acquirement of power was not in the best interest of the destroyed person, as it led to his death. Of course here the Nietzsche-an could counter-argue and say something like this: “well, that the person died was just evidence of his weakness, not necessarily that power is not good. After all, the person who ended up killing the other guy now has even more power and thus he is even more good.” But would follow with this. If ethics is a relative concept, and the preferred conception of ethics is power=good and weakness=bad, then, to the person who was attempting to attain power and failed, he was in the good yet it led to the worst kind of weakness, death. So maybe, just maybe, looking for more and more power isn’t the same as goodness after all.
Obviously my arguments aren’t very refined yet nor are they knock-down, but at least I think they show that there’s either some inconsistency in the concept of the master morality or that it’s just something that needs to be worked on by Nietzsche followers. (For all I know someone has made these terms clearer but I’m not familiar with more recent literature on the subject.)
14 March 2008
note:
I am neither addressing absolute skeptics, nor men in any state of fictitious doubt.CSP, CP 5.319
06 March 2008
did 'naming and necessity' really defeat descriptivism?
When Kripke is starting the third lecture of Naming and Necessity, he takes a second to look back at the accomplishments of the previous lectures. By Kripke’s own account (N&N p. 106), he has thus far shown how descriptivism falls short, how names are reference-fixers, not synonymous to descriptions, and how identity is a property that should be considered de re instead of de dicto., all worthy topics where Kripke undeniably made some progress. However, the prospect of this paper is to show that, even though Kripke challenged the way philosophers were thinking about these issues at the time, the revolutionary interpretation of his work is a bit unfounded, as some of the important projects of the paper don’t manage to connect.
One of the most important accomplishments of the book is the questioning of the descriptivist theory of proper names. Under the influence of Russell and Strawson, descriptivists conceived of proper names as synonymous either to a definite description or a cluster of descriptions that may have either conjunctly or disjunctly added up to the name at hand. This analysis of names conflated statements of a priori and necessary truths. If, in fact, ‘W. Bush’ meant ‘The only former governor of Texas who became president as of 2002,’ then this apparently contingent fact about the person W. Bush becomes a necessary one. However, intuition makes us strongly want to disagree with these consequences, as we feel that, but of course, W. Bush could have lost to Gore in the 2000 election.
That being said, Kripke made us think twice about whether names could really be descriptions because then any cognitive or even linguistic association we have with a give name is not only contingent, but also incomplete. Most people would not be able to give a uniquely satisfying criterion to any proper name, even those of our most intimate acquaintances. At the very least it is not a necessary precondition for proper use of a given name. If I wish to refer to Bach, and all I know of him is that he is a German composer, I can still l properly use his name even though I probably wouldn’t be able to name a single particular work he has created. Nevertheless, I am still talking about him and there is no reason to believe I am in any way misguided in what a descriptivist would have to admit being a meaningless utterance.
However, what comes into question is Kripke’s methodology. Kripke lays out a formal, comprehensive, and rigorous theory regarding proper names under the guise of a proper Descriptivist agenda. To this set of 6 theses and 1 non-circularity satisfaction condition (p. 71), he goes on to prove how each thesis is either misguided or doesn’t satisfy the non-circularity condition. This is fair enough, given his presentation of the theses. However, even though he shows that descriptivism is not the right kind of theory or proper names, he goes on to attempt to prove that a descriptivist picture won’t do either. I’m not so sure he actually makes this point.
Descriptivism, as a picture of names--as opposed to a full on theory, would fail if one could prove that descriptions of any kind are not always necessary for the use of proper names in a language. Further, Kripke would have to show how descriptions are irrelevant to proper names. If there is a way to introduce a name without any descriptive element, the anti-descriptivist wins. Kripke shows us how a name could be used without there being descriptions immediately attached: through the causal or historical chain attached to the name and object. However, how is it thatnames come to be to begin with?
Kripke gives us with two possible alternatives, the first being completely descriptive. One can introduce a name into a language by fixing a reference from a rigid designator. If, for example, I want to talk about the northernmost point in the continental United States, I could designate the name “Tom” to that spot.[1] With this kind of name origination, the description is ever present and thus we should consider the other option.
The second (and last) way Kripke discusses introducing proper names in to a language is through the initial baptism. What does this ceremony entail? Well there is something in front of you, and there is some suggestive gesture that the person who originates the naming will, from that point forward, call that thing by some name. Now, suppose it is a puppy. The owner of the puppy presumably looks at it and says, or even thinks, “I shall name it ‘Max’.” But what is the it? Is it possible, as a Quinian might say, that one is actually naming the un-detached puppy head? Or is it possible that you’re actually talking about the stage of puppy-life when they are that young? Or perhaps even giving a part of the puppy-collective? Well, presumably, no. What one is naming is the puppy itself. So whether explicit or not, one is thinking “I shall name that puppy ‘Max.”
In introducing the name along with the ‘sortal’, one is at least providing some kind of descriptive element when introducing the name, even in the event of baptism. Otherwise it would be left arguably ambiguous what exactly one was naming in the act of the initial baptism. If in fact it is true that all of these cases of baptism involve a sortal, and if sortals are descriptive, then both options explored by Kripke would include descriptions and descriptivism, in some modified way, is still a force to be dealt with. Further, descriptivism would not have been completely defeated.
But are these two methods of introducing proper names exhaustive? A possible counter-example to this line of argumentation, and it would come from the likes of people who might assert that there are times when one privately baptizes things around them. Say one is found in a novel environment, alone, perhaps a foreign wilderness, where one is unfamiliar with the fauna around oneself. Then perhaps it would make sense that this person would look at something and name it in their own mind without externally expressing anything at all. Surely, here there is no descriptive element? Well I think I would argue against that. Perhaps one doesn’t vocalize any sortal description, perhaps one doesn’t even speak to oneself using any sortal terms. Nevertheless, one looks at the certain thing and decides about that thing, whether it is the head of that thing (a head is a thing, after all) or that fauna in its entirety, or whatever one decides of that thing to call it by a certain name. Otherwise the intention of naming something fails to stick on to anything, throwing names into the dark.
Now that we have shown that there is a good argument that even baptisms include descriptions, and that the two options presented are tentatively exhaustive. Also, the previously mentioned method of introducing names via definite descriptions includes descriptions too, thus making both name-introducing mechanisms Kripke proposes dependent on descriptions. Why shouldn’t this theory of proper names be just a peculiar type of descriptivism, perhaps a des-Kripke-vism? Well the answer to this is once again return to the text carefully analyze Kripke’s arguments. The main point of contention seems to be that even if we allow for descriptive elements present at the inception of a name, carrying descriptions through to every possible use of the name, that is, making original descriptions necessarily known at every instance of its use, would lead to unacceptable conclusions including but not limited to: a conflation of the a priori and the necessary, determinism, and circularity.
So how has Kripke fared so far? Well he has definitely pointed out some difficulties in the descriptivist theory of proper names as presented his own manner. As a complete theory, Kripke has irrefutably proven that it fails, especially given the non-circularity conditions. However, in the beginning of his third lecture Kripke is arguing that the descriptivist camp not only failed to provide a theory, but that it also failed to give an adequate picture. Well I guess here it a matter of definition what one means to say that the descriptivist picture has failed. If by descriptivist picture one just means to say that hey, descriptions do play a major part in any theory of names, then Kripke here is just flat out wrong, since even his anti-descriptivist manifesto cannot dispense with descriptions altogether.
On the other hand, if one considers showing that descriptivism was the wrong type of picture we were looking for when it came to proper names was just denying the descriptivism as presented by Russell and potentially his close followers, then I guess Kripke did a very good job. And considering the fact that a whole lot of people still had Russell's “On Denoting” in a special drawer reserved for canonical, unquestionable texts, this achievement alone is very impressive.
The causal theory of names presented by Kripke isn’t held to the same rigorous standards descriptivists are held to. After presenting a theory of descriptivism and refuting it, Kripke doesn’t really show that the picture of descriptivism, as a rough sketch, might be at least in part right. When he provides his alternative, he first doesn’t even provide the audience with a rigorous theory. This is acceptable: he doesn’t intend to provide a rigorous theory. However, the picture he gives us of the causal theory of names is quasi-descriptivist, or at least retains some of the descriptive elements he was setting out to refute. Sure, Kripke’s theory differs from Russell's and in significant ways. Reference and use of a particular name can be continued without uniquely identifying knowledge, and names are passed by mostly if not entirely through the historical connections of use of words in presence of others. The initial users of the name, whether through introduction by rigid designation or through baptism, did have some descriptive association that was necessary for the introduction of the name. When the names are passed down, this necessary descriptive connection could potentially be lost (and, often, it actually is lost). That these names gain new descriptive associations is also a part of the causal-historical chain. However, the original descriptions don’t have to be thereby the time you move to the nth person down the line.
It becomes difficult to me to decide whether or not Kripke’s theory of proper names completely takes descriptivism off the map or not. Ultimately it’s not for me to decide, as a lowly undergraduate student. The social element of passing down names and the potential loss of meaning or descriptive associations with the name was a significant step forward. Conversely, because even when providing a supposed antithesis of the Descriptivist program Kripke ends up relying on descriptions himself, I can’t really say descriptivism was fully eliminates the still-powerful intuition that names have to have been linked to some identifying description
Works Cited
Saul Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[1] There may be some ambiguity of scope here. I could be talking about the actual northernmost spot and naming it “Tom”, or I could be talking about the northern-most spot, whatever that may be, and naming that spot “Tom”. To clarify, I’m discussing the de dicto implications.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
05 March 2008
incomplete answers to some queries
C (hey C!) asked some interesting and important questions which i will repost briefly. i will attempt to answer them as an exercise in critical engagement with the text.
he asks:
(1) what are the implications of when we are mistaken about concepts in this manner?
(2) Since employment of the two different concepts in the same linguistic instance results in the same answer, what is the fundamental difference between employing the two? Is the answer yielded actually the "same"?
(3) How does this differ from other forms of skeptical possibility, if at all? Does this generate a sort of skeptical problem similar to the Cartesian one?
ok. i think i'll try to answer (3) first, as it will make the answers to the other questions clearer. the skepticism kripkenstein presents is much more devastating than descartes's. this is because descartes's skepticism was epistemological in character, whereras this skepticism is both epistemological and metaphysical. descartes's skepticism was with the goal of establishing a certain, true set of beliefs from which to base the rest of his epistemological enterprise. foundationalist through and through, he designated an epistemically privileged set of propositions that he used to justify shakier propositions, so to speak. and much has been written (cs peirce, susan haack) about how this kind of cartesian epistemic skepticism was pretty much just bafoonery to get to propositions he wouldn't alter anyway because they were 'clear' and 'distinct' to him anyway, thanks to god.
however, kripkenstein's skeptical paradox is a more serious threat. not only does the quaddition example show that we, at this moment, don't know whether we are using addition or quaddition, an epistemic skepticism, there is no fact of the matter as to what mathematical function we are performing at the moment, a metaphysical skepticism. this of course extends to previous uses of the function and future uses of the function. and then the same principle carries over to not only addition, but ultimately every function, name, natural kind term, description, etc.
so, if we take a step back for a sec, what kripkenstein is actually doing is presenting to us a very real, encompassing, epistemological as well as ontological skepticism of meaning that pretty much runs the full sweep of both speech acts and mental acts. there is no fact of the matter concerning what we ever mean by any linguistic utterance. part of the problem here, of course, is that there is an underlying assumption that we have to explain meaning in terms of something else, but that problem isn't very relevant for the present discussion, so we'll just give it to him for now.
now to address (1). well the implication here is that we don't ever know what we're talking or thinking about because there is never any fact of the matter as to what we are talking or thinking about! the implications themselves are rather tough to formulate apart from this previous statement. my initial reaction was to say that "even if we think we know what we're talking about, we don't actually know because there is no fact to speak of." but the problems of saying this are pretty evident: i mean, communication in general would be a farse, but further even the possibility of cogent thought comes into question. if we take kripkenstein's skepticism seriously, then it is almost undeniably, irrefutably serious!
finally, for (2) i'm going to use another mathematical example. the functions (n+m), (n x m), and (n^m) are of course different functions. but if we happen to say for each of these functions n=2=m, then they all yield the same answer. the fundamental difference in them is the nature of the method of manipulating the numbers, but given specific circumstances they might coincide in output. the problem with kripkenstein's kind of skepticism is that all math, all communication through symbols, actually, is lacking meaning. if nothing has meaning, because there is no ontological fact concerning meaning, then every communicative act is a coincidence, just as those functions happened to coincide at 2.
well i hope i helped a bit, as it helped me understand kripkenstein a bit more myself.
he asks:
(1) what are the implications of when we are mistaken about concepts in this manner?
(2) Since employment of the two different concepts in the same linguistic instance results in the same answer, what is the fundamental difference between employing the two? Is the answer yielded actually the "same"?
(3) How does this differ from other forms of skeptical possibility, if at all? Does this generate a sort of skeptical problem similar to the Cartesian one?
ok. i think i'll try to answer (3) first, as it will make the answers to the other questions clearer. the skepticism kripkenstein presents is much more devastating than descartes's. this is because descartes's skepticism was epistemological in character, whereras this skepticism is both epistemological and metaphysical. descartes's skepticism was with the goal of establishing a certain, true set of beliefs from which to base the rest of his epistemological enterprise. foundationalist through and through, he designated an epistemically privileged set of propositions that he used to justify shakier propositions, so to speak. and much has been written (cs peirce, susan haack) about how this kind of cartesian epistemic skepticism was pretty much just bafoonery to get to propositions he wouldn't alter anyway because they were 'clear' and 'distinct' to him anyway, thanks to god.
however, kripkenstein's skeptical paradox is a more serious threat. not only does the quaddition example show that we, at this moment, don't know whether we are using addition or quaddition, an epistemic skepticism, there is no fact of the matter as to what mathematical function we are performing at the moment, a metaphysical skepticism. this of course extends to previous uses of the function and future uses of the function. and then the same principle carries over to not only addition, but ultimately every function, name, natural kind term, description, etc.
so, if we take a step back for a sec, what kripkenstein is actually doing is presenting to us a very real, encompassing, epistemological as well as ontological skepticism of meaning that pretty much runs the full sweep of both speech acts and mental acts. there is no fact of the matter concerning what we ever mean by any linguistic utterance. part of the problem here, of course, is that there is an underlying assumption that we have to explain meaning in terms of something else, but that problem isn't very relevant for the present discussion, so we'll just give it to him for now.
now to address (1). well the implication here is that we don't ever know what we're talking or thinking about because there is never any fact of the matter as to what we are talking or thinking about! the implications themselves are rather tough to formulate apart from this previous statement. my initial reaction was to say that "even if we think we know what we're talking about, we don't actually know because there is no fact to speak of." but the problems of saying this are pretty evident: i mean, communication in general would be a farse, but further even the possibility of cogent thought comes into question. if we take kripkenstein's skepticism seriously, then it is almost undeniably, irrefutably serious!
finally, for (2) i'm going to use another mathematical example. the functions (n+m), (n x m), and (n^m) are of course different functions. but if we happen to say for each of these functions n=2=m, then they all yield the same answer. the fundamental difference in them is the nature of the method of manipulating the numbers, but given specific circumstances they might coincide in output. the problem with kripkenstein's kind of skepticism is that all math, all communication through symbols, actually, is lacking meaning. if nothing has meaning, because there is no ontological fact concerning meaning, then every communicative act is a coincidence, just as those functions happened to coincide at 2.
well i hope i helped a bit, as it helped me understand kripkenstein a bit more myself.
29 February 2008
kripkenstein's quaddition - exposition
oh kripke... or kripkenstein.. or whatever...
so here's the real deal. i have not read wittgenstein's philosophical investigations so take this entire post with a grain of salt--or a heap of it.
anyway the argument as it struck kripke goes somewhat like this:
suppose you've never performed the mathematical function "plus" with integers greater than 50. A is a teacher and YOU are B.
A: "17 plus 23 is..."
B: "40"
A: "yes! you got it! now, 58 plus 67 is..."
B [takes a bit longer. B computes in his head] "125."
A: "uh... i'm sorry. i don't think you understand. try again."
B [computes again]: "no i did it again in my head and.. well i was right. it's 125."
A: "uh... i think someone didn't teach you this right. 58 plus 67 is 5."
B: [baffled] "whaatt??"
so here's the trick. when you heard the word "plus" you thought that was a function where you combine numbers , such that
'plus (a,b)' = addition (a,b) --> 'a + b' when {x| -∞, ∞}
however, it is not logically inconsistent that "plus" really referred to the function of quaddition such that
'plus* (a,b)' = quaddition (a,b) ---> 'a+ b' when {x| -∞, 50} and '5' when {x| 50, ∞}
now, it's important to note that this skeptic who is proposing this skeptical scenario is not being a skeptic about the concept of addition. he's not saying that the concept of addition is vague in any way. he's just saying that it's not logically inconsistent to propose that it may be the case that whenever we use the word "addition" or the mathematical symbol of "+" we might be talking about quaddition instead of addition.
this skepticism, however, is not just an epistemological skepticism about whether we know we're adding or quadding, but it extends to a metaphysical skepticism about our own use of concepts. we can think we know what concept we're using but we could be mistaken.
i'm interested to see how or if kripke attempts to solve this...
so here's the real deal. i have not read wittgenstein's philosophical investigations so take this entire post with a grain of salt--or a heap of it.
anyway the argument as it struck kripke goes somewhat like this:
suppose you've never performed the mathematical function "plus" with integers greater than 50. A is a teacher and YOU are B.
A: "17 plus 23 is..."
B: "40"
A: "yes! you got it! now, 58 plus 67 is..."
B [takes a bit longer. B computes in his head] "125."
A: "uh... i'm sorry. i don't think you understand. try again."
B [computes again]: "no i did it again in my head and.. well i was right. it's 125."
A: "uh... i think someone didn't teach you this right. 58 plus 67 is 5."
B: [baffled] "whaatt??"
so here's the trick. when you heard the word "plus" you thought that was a function where you combine numbers , such that
'plus (a,b)' = addition (a,b) --> 'a + b' when {x| -∞, ∞}
however, it is not logically inconsistent that "plus" really referred to the function of quaddition such that
'plus* (a,b)' = quaddition (a,b) ---> 'a+ b' when {x| -∞, 50} and '5' when {x| 50, ∞}
now, it's important to note that this skeptic who is proposing this skeptical scenario is not being a skeptic about the concept of addition. he's not saying that the concept of addition is vague in any way. he's just saying that it's not logically inconsistent to propose that it may be the case that whenever we use the word "addition" or the mathematical symbol of "+" we might be talking about quaddition instead of addition.
this skepticism, however, is not just an epistemological skepticism about whether we know we're adding or quadding, but it extends to a metaphysical skepticism about our own use of concepts. we can think we know what concept we're using but we could be mistaken.
i'm interested to see how or if kripke attempts to solve this...
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