on the ethics of discourse

(for the purposes of this post, i will be using a very primitive notion of right and wrong)

how okay is it to use as much rhetoric, outside of logic, in order to argue for something in the course of some discourse?

my gut reaction is to say that it's not okay at all. but there seems to be a very big difference, though, if you consider certain types of rhetorical devices (mostly the aesthetically inclined ones) than if you consider certain rhetorical methods that directly contradict logic (affirming the consequent, or whatever.)

let's take some concrete examples. using anaphora is a well known method for capturing the attention of the audience, especially if spoken. This seems harmless, and it sure does sound good.

on the other hand, affirming the consequent is a straightforwardly false in deductive logic. and unless used in a provisional and very specifically delineated discussion (where it might be justifiable under the guise of an abductive inference), it would be either a formal fallacy (to some uninformed speaker) or an intentional manipulation (where it would be used as a rhetorical device). either way, some shady stuff is going on and there very clearly see that something bad is going on here.

but even upon reconsideration of the previous example, of the aesthetically-motivated rhetoric, is there more to these devices than meets the eye? could it be that these rhetorical methods are distracting from the point of the message? in some way, is discourse supposed to be just presenting the facts in a logical manner without the hooplah and smoke and mirrors that any rhetorical device other than the clear argumentation only cold hard logic can offer?

no way, that can't be right either. i need to unstiffen my requirements for an acceptable discourse, as those aesthetically motivated rhetorical devices add a lot to some speeches, they help deliver the message more than hinder it. such as in dr. king's "i have a dream" speech, which is in english language anthologies nationwide.

could it be that any of these methods are acceptable if the GOAL of the discourse if justified, or in any case "right" by some other standard? this is a question i'll leave for another time

Hume & extreme empiricism

Hume's extreme skepticism about any empirical, observed knowledge of the external world is based on a very misguided and extreme empiricism. Although he allows for knowledge of certain simple mathematical and logical truths, anything beyond that is not directly supported by experience, and thus condemned unreasonable. To reconstruct his argument briefly: when interacting with the external world, we can be sure of our impressions of the sensations from the external input. However, we can never be certain about anything regarding these impressions other than that we experience them. Thus, making any sort of rational statement about these impressions goes beyond our experience. We are so uncertain about these impressions that we cannot be even sure that impressions we have received in times prior following a certain pattern will continue to do so. This is what some philosophers have called the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature (PUN). It is because of PUN that we believe something causes another thing. This principle is in fact an inferred hypothesis (induction) that has appeared to work in the past; but because we can’t truly experience this uniformity—only the perceived effects of it were it true—there is no rational way we can justify our own belief in its (PUN’s) existence. Moreover, because most, if not all observational (i.e. scientific) knowledge is based on this assumption, we have no more reason to believe in scientific knowledge than any other method of obtaining knowledge—methods a scientific person may consider to be complete hogwash (i.e. tarot, soothsaying, etc).

Obviously Hume goes wrong somewhere in this argument. Scientific knowledge does, more often than not, make accurate predictions about the future. They predict astrological phenomena all the time, for one. We also rely on technologies that have been enabled for use by scientific and engineering advances only producible by the application of scientific formulas that have at least at some point or another been tested with the rigor of experience. But finding these types of examples would not persuade anyone just yet, we must somehow prove the validity of the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature.

To be quite honest I’ve always been inclined to just toss aside skepticism of this nature because it seems so set against the intuitive outlook of the world that it can’t possibly be right. But let us give the skeptic a fighting chance. First, the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature is the assumption that underlies any notion of cause and effect. No principle of the uniformity of nature and no induction is possible. Inductions of all shapes and kinds would be impossible. If the clouds were really dark outside, the temperature dropped various degrees, and you heard a couple of thunderclaps, you would have no more reason to believe that there was going to be a nasty thunderstorm than if you were to believe that a sandstorm were to appear where you stood. Or that you were going to spontaneously combust. This is ludicrous!

We experience the PUN because we continue to see patterns emerging in significant ways in our everyday lives; we are actually more reasonable to believe in it than not. If you were to eat, among other things, tomato one day and you break out in hives, you realize that something you ate today might have brought those hives. After some self experimentation, or a visit to an allergist, you realize that eating tomatoes will be directly followed by those hives, and assuming you don’t like hives, you will discontinue your ingestion of tomatoes. Being a reasonable person, in my opinion, is at least in part recognizing that these patterns do emerge, identifying the relevant patterns in your life, and the acting accordingly. These patterns are experienced if only we expand on our notion from the Humean, mostly barren idea that we can only experience sense impressions, to a more broad conception of experience as the interaction between the senses and our own intellect to analyze it.

The main problem justifying this PUN philosophically is that it is an induction. Inductions are, by definition, logical inferences that will never be 100% certain. They are the proposal of a general rule or probability based on the experience of one thing following another significant amount of times. Inductions themselves are not deductively provable. Deductions are the other way around, there is a rule, and we are used to apply that rule in order to get the output. Deductions actually take less thought, because as long as you understand the rule, you can never misuse it. Inductions are a bit more synthetic, because it requires one to recognize patterns. But the induction itself, as a mechanism of pattern-recognition, is not itself applicable to any deduction, and it is thus deductively invalid. But this is okay! It doesn’t have to be!

The practice of creating and using inductions is valid because it works. Inductions have worked, do work, and there is no reason to believe that they will stop working any time soon. We have a great, vast amount of evidence that inductions have worked. Every time that we set foot in a car we are actually making an induction—that it will work just like the last time, that our seatbelt will actually work according to the standard safety regulations—and we are betting our lives on it. I guess this might be a pragmatic justification of induction and, by extension, the PUN.

This is what happens when empiricism is taken to the extreme. In the world of Hume, where no induction is rationally valid or justifiable, we are blind rats living in an ever evolving maze without any cheese. Sure, we can never be 100% sure of our inductions or any observational knowledge, we’d be bigger fools to think we have no rational reasons to believe them.

architecture of theories

from Charles Sanders Peirce. "The Architecture of Theories." The Monist January 1891. 161-76.

If a man, being seized with the conviction that paper was a good material to make things of, were to go to work to build a papier mache house, with roof of roofing paper, foundations of pasteboard, windows of paraffined paper, chimneys, bathtubs, locks, etc., all of different forms of paper, his experiment would probably afford valuable lessons to builders. But it would certainly make a detestable hosue. So are those one-idea'd philosophers whose work is exceedingly interesting and instructive, and yet are quite unsound.
The remaining systems of philosophy have been of the nature of reforms, sometimes amounting to radical revolutions, suggested by certain difficulties which have been found to beset systems previously in vogue; and such ought certainly to be in large part the motive of any new theory. This is like partially rebuilding a house. the faults that have been committed are, first, that the dilapidations have generally not been sufficiently thoroughgoing, and second, that not sufficient pains has been taken to bring the additions into deep harmony with the really sound parts of the old structure.
When a man is about to build a house, what a power of thinking he has to do, before he can safely break ground! with what pains he has to excogitate the precise wants that are to be supplied! what a study to ascertain the most available and suitable materials, to determine the mode of construction to which those materials are best adapted, and to answer a hundred such questions! Now, without riding the metaphor too far, i think we may safely say that the studies preliminary to the construction of a great theory should be at least as deliberate and thorough as those that are preliminary to the building of a dwelling-house.

What an insight. In order to create a philosophical system, we have to make sure that we're not only using sound architectural design, but we also need to use the right materials and survey the land for the best place. Great analogy

two abductive syllogisms

a formal [[EDIT 11/30: not formal, but CRITICAL]] analysis of two abductive arguments:

first, the creationists' argument for god from intelligent design.

(a) there is this universe which is gloriously complex (assumed)
(b) if god exists, there would be this universe which is gloriously complex (assumed)
(c) god exists (aim)

now as philosophers we have to define god. let's take the christian one, an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent one. the idea is that only god could design this universe.

now the proper inquirer not only has to draw consequences of god existing, (there's lots of negative evidence. anything from the earth being created longer ago than several thousand years, to the fact that a triple O god would not allow for natural disasters, war, or just insert whatever evidence against god you like), but also notes that (1) it's completely unnecessary for explanation of the universe's complexity (this is where natural physical law and evolution come in) and (2) it wouldn't cohere with the rest of the scientific picture of how the world works. (1) and (2) are the epistemic virtues of parsimony and coherence.

now, because there are arguments against god's existence, because god existing is unnecessary to explain the complexity of the universe, and because it wouldn't fit in with the rest of the evidence we have about the world, that makes three strikes, the abduction is an invalid one. so, what does this finally prove? this proves that a christian god cannot explain why the universe is beautiful and complex and all that good stuff.

now, to the objective reality/scientific realism argument.

(d) science works. (assumed)
(e) if there's a world out there independent of what we believe, then science would work. (assumed)
(f) there's a world out there independent of what we believe. (aim)

now let's draw some consequences of the antecedent and its negation, just as before. first, draw consequences from (f). there is evidence for reality being independent of what we believe of it as we see through everyday experience (this is the positive evidence bit). it fits in with the rest of our knowledge about the world (the coherence bit). and finally (f) is actually necessary to explain how science works so it is as pasimonious as it's going to get.

now of course i owe an account, a reason as to why it's necessary for there to be a real world independent of you and i to explain that science works. this is easier than it seems. if you never lived, would there still be trees? whether or not anybody ever got to investigate genetics as far as we have, or whether scientists thought it was 48 chromosomes before and think it's 46 now (and change their minds tomorrow), is there a right answer as to how many chromosomes we as humans actually have? if i never went to argentina, would it still be there? the answer to all the questions is yes, and as such give evidence to the contention that in there are bits of reality out there about which we can both state propositions and be causally independent of any individual's beliefs or existence. ultimately, in order to fully investigate the answer of these questions (as a scientist does), then there must be something that you're investigating, otherwise it's just subjective musings.

but now, to be more thorough and fair , let's draw some of the consequences of -(f) [the negation of the conclusion]. -(f) does have an advantage over (f) in its being more barren. but it directly contradicts experience. let me fully illustrate this point:

(1)if there is no world out there independent of what we believe it to be, it follows that the world does depend on what we believe it to be.
(2)some jellyfish are poisonous (i got stung by one last... year, i think?)
(3) but for some jellyfish to be poisonous, then jellyfish must exist whether i think them to exist or not, and being poisonous must be a property that exists whether i ever get stung or not.
(4) but, as constituents of this belief-dependent world, jellyfish being poisonous does depend on my beliefs after all.

(3) and (4) are contradictory, so -(f) does not cohere with the rest of what we know about the world and leads to logical contradictions. and lastly, we have overwhelming evidence against there not being a real world, as with every day of our lives we get in our cars and go places, hug our families, use computers to communicate with other individuals across the country, etc.

(f) has positive evidence, it coheres with our knowledge, yet it does posit more causally necessary entities than

-(f), which is more parsimonious is TOO parsimonious, because then we wouldn't have enough epistemological base for any inquiry of any kind, whether it's a scientist hypothesizing quarks or the layperson trying to figure out how to fix his bike. Furthermore, -(f) has negative evidence, and it does not cohere with experience.

so the abductive syllogism of (d-f) is very well supported a vast amount of positive evidence.

so what does this show? well... it shows that based on the best evidence we have so far, there is a real world out there independently of what we believe. the alternative is that science is just another legitimate dialogue among many, yet could ultimately be dealing in fictions, which (1-4) shows is inconsistent.

also notice that, in order to consider these (and any) abductions, you need go go through the formal process of logical analysis, the pragmatic process of drawing manifested effects of propositions (consequences), AND the external process of empirical investigation.

abduction and occam's razor

gosh i don't know if this is gonna sound obvious but i think i finally understand abduction, it's role in science, and why parsimony is so important in scientific hypotheses! okay so very quickly: three methods of logical arguments: deduction, induction, and abduction.

in a deduction, you have an argument like this:

(1) all things that have hearts also have kidneys.
(2) david has a heart
/(3) david has a kidney

in an induction, you have something like this:

(4) all of these jellybeans in my hand are red
(5) i got these jellybeans from that bag
/(6) all the jellybeans in that bag are red.

in an abduction, your argument goes like this:

(7) the glove fits
(8) if he did the crime, then the glove must fit.
/(9) he did the crime.

so in (1-3) we're applying a conditional to get the consequent, in (4-6) we're inferring the conditional from what seems to be an antecedent and a consequent, and in (7-8) we're inferring the antecedent from a conditional and a consequent.

unless you're an extreme skeptic, deduction is valid if the premises and the negation of the conclusion are inconsistent. for induction, lots of people (hume, popper) have shown that it is isn't 100% accurate at all times or try to get rid of it, but it seems to me that we use it so often and it's true most of the time, so i'll just take it for granted that, even though it's not full proof, it's okay to use (a full explanation as to why i think this would take me into phil of language and metaphysics and i just don't wanna go there... maybe i'll do it at some other time).

now the one that seems to preoccupy some people (e.g. bas van fraassen) the most is abduction (or as some people call it nowadays, inference to the best explanation), especially in the context of science.

as i see it, in science there are problems. and in lots of these problems there is the following implied dillema: "X. Why X?" an example given in words: if i throw an apple into the air, it'll come right back down. why is this so?

in short, there is a phenomenon which already has been established to occur in the world and science's job is to figure out what causes it. if you will, there's a B and we're trying to figure out an A such that A -> B. now, to get a little technical, if the B has already been established as occurring in the world, then it has a truth value of 1 (where 1= true, and 0=false). but if B is already 1, then the relation A -> B will be 1 no matter if A is 1 or 0.

here's where the scientist comes in. the scientist proposes a hypothesis, A, to see if B follows, either necessarily or probably. if it does, then the hypothesis becomes a theory supported by observation. but again, the way he does this is by investigating in the real world. if B follows from A, as hypothesized by the scientist, then we have reason to believe A, making the abductive process complete. if not, try again, with a new antecedent (A*).

now comes the parsimony part. take the previous example given by (7-9). if we amend to (9)

(9)' he did the crime AND panda express is awesome

then the argument would still be valid. because if the rule remains that (8) and we have (9)', we could simplify (9)' to just (9) and

(10) panda express is awesome.

so (7) follows. but, as you can easily see, (10) is completely unnecessary and irrelevant (even if it might be true). that's why scientific theories attempt to posit the most barren metaphysics and the least amount of stuff necessary to solve the problem at hand, all the while trying to explain nature in terms of natural kinds and laws.

damn i just decided i'm gonna tag this aesthetics too because this is just beautiful.