the so-called death of descriptivism

for a very long time--actually from about russell's "on denoting" paper published in the 1900's (decade, not century) till circa 1980--descriptivism ruled the theory of proper names. names did not actually denote anothing according to this view, but were shorthand versions of descriptions. names were descriptions, which in turn gave meaning to the term. so a proper name gave a unique description to the individual in question and that's what the individual was. the main motivation for this position was a fregean reaction against the millian view of proper names where a name just meant that thing you're talking about.

then of course the young prodigy savior of modal semantics saul kripke came along and revolutionized the entire field of philosophy of language. as mcginn noted in his review of the book in philosophical review, either you hated naming and necessity, you loved it, or you were genuinely confused. this new causal-historical view of names was completely different from the descriptivism that preceded it and there was a huge party for those who feared metaphysical committment and nominalists were happy and ockam had a party in his grave and all that good stuff and blah blah blah blah blah.

but was this celebration justified? was descriptivism really defeated like kripke thought?

as that young, star-crossed poet juliet once said, "what's in a name? a rose by any other name would smell as sweet!" this insight would play right into the conniving hands of kripke, who would make it seem that it shows how names are arbitrarily chosen to baptize a particular entity, whether an individual or a natural kind or whatever. but then i guess the nature of the question shifts as one attempts to pinpoint how names are actually acquired.

according to kripke, in the second lecture of the book, delivered in princeton i believe it was the 22nd of january, 1970, proper names for particular entities or kinds are introduced into a language one of either two ways. the first way is by fixing the reference by means of description. in other words i might say, "i need a name for the hairiest cuban-american raised in miami currently studying in scotland. i shall name him 'G'." see what i did there was that i came up with a definite description. instead of using that definite description every single time i want to refer to this particular individual, i pretty much just came up with a shortcut of sorts.

the other way one can introduce a name into a language is by using ostensive gestures, pretty much. so in other words you might go ahead and visit your local animal shelter and pick out a puppy from there. you take it home and you point at it and you say "i shall name this dog, 'D'." you could just say "D" as you point at it but then, of course as quine might point out, you might be naming the dog, sure, but you also might be naming the puppy slice or the undetatched puppy part or whatever the fuck that crazy quine might say. so even if you don't downright say "the dog's name is 'D'," in your mind you make the connection between the name and the type of thing you're actually naming. however, including this 'type' categorization or as kripke calls it the 'sortal' word as well, you ARE including a descriptive element to the ostensive definition as well.

going back to the famous shakespeare quotation once again, sure that rose could have any other name and smell sweet. but whenever somebody decided to call it a "rose" they said hey, look at that fucking flower over there, i'm gonna name it "rose." so, at the very least in the introduction of the term, the name of the plant was coupled with a recognition of what they were talking about and thus a description.

so basically what i'm trying to say here is that, even in kripke's view, descriptions are INDISPENSABLE, and are thus built in to EVERY noun term--whether it be proper or categorical-- and kripke pretty much fails in debunking good ol' earl of russell.

Hume & extreme empiricism

Hume's extreme skepticism about any empirical, observed knowledge of the external world is based on a very misguided and extreme empiricism. Although he allows for knowledge of certain simple mathematical and logical truths, anything beyond that is not directly supported by experience, and thus condemned unreasonable. To reconstruct his argument briefly: when interacting with the external world, we can be sure of our impressions of the sensations from the external input. However, we can never be certain about anything regarding these impressions other than that we experience them. Thus, making any sort of rational statement about these impressions goes beyond our experience. We are so uncertain about these impressions that we cannot be even sure that impressions we have received in times prior following a certain pattern will continue to do so. This is what some philosophers have called the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature (PUN). It is because of PUN that we believe something causes another thing. This principle is in fact an inferred hypothesis (induction) that has appeared to work in the past; but because we can’t truly experience this uniformity—only the perceived effects of it were it true—there is no rational way we can justify our own belief in its (PUN’s) existence. Moreover, because most, if not all observational (i.e. scientific) knowledge is based on this assumption, we have no more reason to believe in scientific knowledge than any other method of obtaining knowledge—methods a scientific person may consider to be complete hogwash (i.e. tarot, soothsaying, etc).

Obviously Hume goes wrong somewhere in this argument. Scientific knowledge does, more often than not, make accurate predictions about the future. They predict astrological phenomena all the time, for one. We also rely on technologies that have been enabled for use by scientific and engineering advances only producible by the application of scientific formulas that have at least at some point or another been tested with the rigor of experience. But finding these types of examples would not persuade anyone just yet, we must somehow prove the validity of the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature.

To be quite honest I’ve always been inclined to just toss aside skepticism of this nature because it seems so set against the intuitive outlook of the world that it can’t possibly be right. But let us give the skeptic a fighting chance. First, the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature is the assumption that underlies any notion of cause and effect. No principle of the uniformity of nature and no induction is possible. Inductions of all shapes and kinds would be impossible. If the clouds were really dark outside, the temperature dropped various degrees, and you heard a couple of thunderclaps, you would have no more reason to believe that there was going to be a nasty thunderstorm than if you were to believe that a sandstorm were to appear where you stood. Or that you were going to spontaneously combust. This is ludicrous!

We experience the PUN because we continue to see patterns emerging in significant ways in our everyday lives; we are actually more reasonable to believe in it than not. If you were to eat, among other things, tomato one day and you break out in hives, you realize that something you ate today might have brought those hives. After some self experimentation, or a visit to an allergist, you realize that eating tomatoes will be directly followed by those hives, and assuming you don’t like hives, you will discontinue your ingestion of tomatoes. Being a reasonable person, in my opinion, is at least in part recognizing that these patterns do emerge, identifying the relevant patterns in your life, and the acting accordingly. These patterns are experienced if only we expand on our notion from the Humean, mostly barren idea that we can only experience sense impressions, to a more broad conception of experience as the interaction between the senses and our own intellect to analyze it.

The main problem justifying this PUN philosophically is that it is an induction. Inductions are, by definition, logical inferences that will never be 100% certain. They are the proposal of a general rule or probability based on the experience of one thing following another significant amount of times. Inductions themselves are not deductively provable. Deductions are the other way around, there is a rule, and we are used to apply that rule in order to get the output. Deductions actually take less thought, because as long as you understand the rule, you can never misuse it. Inductions are a bit more synthetic, because it requires one to recognize patterns. But the induction itself, as a mechanism of pattern-recognition, is not itself applicable to any deduction, and it is thus deductively invalid. But this is okay! It doesn’t have to be!

The practice of creating and using inductions is valid because it works. Inductions have worked, do work, and there is no reason to believe that they will stop working any time soon. We have a great, vast amount of evidence that inductions have worked. Every time that we set foot in a car we are actually making an induction—that it will work just like the last time, that our seatbelt will actually work according to the standard safety regulations—and we are betting our lives on it. I guess this might be a pragmatic justification of induction and, by extension, the PUN.

This is what happens when empiricism is taken to the extreme. In the world of Hume, where no induction is rationally valid or justifiable, we are blind rats living in an ever evolving maze without any cheese. Sure, we can never be 100% sure of our inductions or any observational knowledge, we’d be bigger fools to think we have no rational reasons to believe them.

architecture of theories

from Charles Sanders Peirce. "The Architecture of Theories." The Monist January 1891. 161-76.

If a man, being seized with the conviction that paper was a good material to make things of, were to go to work to build a papier mache house, with roof of roofing paper, foundations of pasteboard, windows of paraffined paper, chimneys, bathtubs, locks, etc., all of different forms of paper, his experiment would probably afford valuable lessons to builders. But it would certainly make a detestable hosue. So are those one-idea'd philosophers whose work is exceedingly interesting and instructive, and yet are quite unsound.
The remaining systems of philosophy have been of the nature of reforms, sometimes amounting to radical revolutions, suggested by certain difficulties which have been found to beset systems previously in vogue; and such ought certainly to be in large part the motive of any new theory. This is like partially rebuilding a house. the faults that have been committed are, first, that the dilapidations have generally not been sufficiently thoroughgoing, and second, that not sufficient pains has been taken to bring the additions into deep harmony with the really sound parts of the old structure.
When a man is about to build a house, what a power of thinking he has to do, before he can safely break ground! with what pains he has to excogitate the precise wants that are to be supplied! what a study to ascertain the most available and suitable materials, to determine the mode of construction to which those materials are best adapted, and to answer a hundred such questions! Now, without riding the metaphor too far, i think we may safely say that the studies preliminary to the construction of a great theory should be at least as deliberate and thorough as those that are preliminary to the building of a dwelling-house.

What an insight. In order to create a philosophical system, we have to make sure that we're not only using sound architectural design, but we also need to use the right materials and survey the land for the best place. Great analogy

scotch part 1

so, since i've been trying different whiskys lately i'm going to start a column that i will update every now and then on whisk(e)y. of course most of my early experiences with whisky came in bourbons, but anyway here is my review of the ones i've tried so far:

Blends

Jim Beam White Label - tastes like a hangover

Dewars White Label - not all that bad for a cheap drink... a bit on the strong side and you could taste the grains

Jack Daniel's Old No.7 - Dark crimson in color. mmm corn and strength and earth and doesn't hurt the pocket that much. very sweet. smooth, after all.

Jack Daniel's Gentleman's Blend - tastes similar to its younger sister, yet with a bit more sophistication and woods. very good

Johnnie Walker Red Label - Copper in color. tastes like EARTH, must've used a lot of islay in this blend. it was the first scotch i drank without a flavored mixer ( i had it on the rocks).

Johnnie Walker Black Label - Light brown in color. very fruity at first, then a smoke, then a little bit of earth. pretty good, complex blend. nice character. best bang for the buck.

Johnnie Walker Green Label (Technically vatted, not blended) - old gold in color. tastes like peat. very smooth and a good flavor of maybe a bit of flowers? good value.

Johnnie Walker Blue Label - rich smoky peaty, yet with some light notes on the exhale. very good.

The Dimple Pinch 15 Years - tastes like cake. then get that cake and drop it on the soil. don't follow the 5 second rule. actually kick it while it's down there. make sure it's a fruit cake.

Chivas Regal 12 Years - dark amber in color. don't remember much about this one other than it was very smooth

Single Malts (location)

Talisker 10 Years (Island) - inhale a cigar. then add abit more of smoke with some malty syrup. then a bit more smoke. then at the end, some recently ground peper that leaves your mouth with some spicy stuff on it.

Laphroaig 10 Years (Islay) - get some tires and then burn them right next to you. then INHALE. once you feel like you're about to pass out, INHALE. but make sure you have some salt on your nose before you inhale. if you forgot, put some on now.

The Glenlivet 12 Years (Speyside) - very, very smooth whisky. butter with some spices and some flowers. maybe a tiny bit of earth, but you really have to look for it.

The Glenlivet 15 Years French Oak Reserve (Speyside) - take a bouquet of cinnamon and then drench it with vanilla. add some more seasonal flowers and some cake. while you're there add some cognac. very complex and pretty good. not so bad on the pocket either.

Glenmorangie 10 Years Original (Highland) - very light gold in color. take some pears and some peaches and other light fruits squeeze them over some vanilla orchids . take the very cool and delicate flavor and sprinkle in some sea salt. over it. oooh still the best i've had.

Glenmorangie 12 Years Port Wood Finish (Highland) - darkened red gold in color. mm take some glenmorangie 10 and then mix in a bit of wine, add smoke and throw in even more vanilla. add some dark chocolate.

Oban 14 Years (West Highland) - you're at the beach and then you eat some dark fruits and yellow cake. then you smoke a cigar that has been dipped in peat, but you only take a wiff.

The Macallan 15 Years Fine Oak Finish (Speyside) - color is the reddish tint of gold the sun gets at the threshold between the late afternoon and the early evening. take a whiff: dried fruits. a little bit of pudding. maybe a hint of orange. then swish it in your mouth a bit. some of the initial sweet tones fade quickly to make room for chocolate, a tiny bit of spice and some smoke. the finish is almost completely spicy dark chocolate.

Highland Park 12 Years (Island) - later

identity and descriptive names

oooh crap well i was shaving today and i realized:

i've argued before for a descriptivist theory of proper names mostly based on my particular views on personal identity. My intuition has been that you wouldn't be the same person if you decided to play basketball instead of fencing, or if you decided to become a math major instead of a philosophy one.

but, as my dissentors have pointed out, this identity of personhood isn't the same sense identity is being used when describing the person, because one is an "identity" construed in a psychological sense of what defines a person and the other is a mathematical statement based on an equivalence relationship (you are you)... or is it??

check it out: if you decide to go eat dinner with your friends instead of working out, you are inhaling the atoms around the restaurant instead of those at the gym, you're eating the particular food you ate instead of burning some calories, you're stimulating your mind with the lively conversation with your friends instead of stimulating your muscle cells to grow or your lung capacity to increase. in other words, the course of actions you take does directly effect a difference in chemical composition of your body itself, which in turn in a very literal sense make you a different person, if looked at from an atomical perspective. and if you believe that difference in sub-particles affect difference in structure, then whabam! different person.

unless i'm jumping the gun here, this would mean that the descriptions associated with your name or mine are directly connected to some difference in chemical composition associated with those descriptions, effectively being a pretty good place-marker for your identity.

i still have to work out the kinks but i think this probably has some link to a deterministic argument :)