or, contemporary myths in physicalism
dare i suggest that there is a vagueness in what, exactly, is implied in the concept or ontological category of the "physical". our everyday definition of a physical object is something that you can bump your head against. yet it seems that even the most innocent of everyday, physical things are pseudophysical in that they are also at least in some bit abstract. also, some processes of these physical objects get lumped into the physicalist account. does this move the discussion from physical objects to.. well something else?
all in all, there are some specific cases i have in mind...where the vagueness of the category is painfully apparent. here are three scientific examples.
________________________
1. fields - our best physics posits the existence of fields, not only as necessary objects in the universe (as, say, scientists might posit numbers and theories) but also as strictly physical objects. handydandy wikipedia says that a field is 'the presence of a physical quantity at every point in spacetime.' hm.. something should ring a bell already as the definition seemed a bit off. the field clearly isn't made up of whatever the most minute particle might be, just as i am or stars are. no, fields seem to be not physical objects themselves but the position, behavior, and propensity for specific physical objects as they pass along specific regions of spacetime. does this add up to a physical object? well no, it's not a physical object and it isn't even made up OF physical objects. so, if even in our most sacred science there are objects that are straddling the line ontologically, what can we expect in other fields?
2. mental states - no doubt our brains have a lot to do with our mental states. so much so, of course, that when our brain ceases to function correctly our mental states cease to function accordingly, ad empirically demonstrated in brain damage studies. but, as some people have asked before me i'm sure, are brain states the same as mental states? is there an identity relationship be tween these two characterizations of whatever it is that's going on inside my head? I think kripke's argument is very powerful... take a look at it and see for yourself.
N= necessarily
P = possibly
(a) N (heat = molecular motion).
this is a necessary a posteriori truth. is it possible to have heat without molecular motion? well no. no matter what, if it's heat, it's caused by molecular motion. sure, there might be sensations of heat without molecular motion. but if it's real heat, it's real molecular motion. now, can we say
(b) ? N (pain = c-fibers firing)
well let's put the identity to the test just like last time. is it possible to have the sensation of pain without it being pain? well it seems like the answer is pretty obvious, NO! if you feel pain you have pain! this calls into question whether c-fibres firing just IS pain. once again, this either means that definition of pain provided by the best anatomical science is incomplete (and it doesn't seem to be, at least here on earth), or that pain just is not the same as c-fibers firing, leaving us with
(c) ~N(pain = c-fibers firing)
rounding out the discussion on physical objects, and brain states, where does this leave us? well it leaves us in a more primitively intuitive position where we think that the brain and its states (physical objects) sure do have a lot to do with our minds (presumably other than physical objects) yet they aren't the same thing. so things like belief, pain, fear, etc are partially physical.
3. species - reading fodor's critique of natural selection has got me thinking a lot about philosophy of biology lately. one of things i've come to believe is that talk of species and groups of animals with similar properties and so forth isn't strictly speaking physical. of course, this comes of no surprise to anyone who's familiar with set theory or even mereology. anyway, the abstractions we can assign to the physical characteristics of individual animals across similar-enough genetic liniage definitely makes the concept of 'species' an ontologically dualist one.
__________________________
well then, what do these suggestions do, if anything? i think it does two things. first, it reinforces the insight mcginn had in saying that ontological categories are oftentimes ill-defined. in these three cases i have given examples with a focus on the vagueness of the 'physical' category, but in doing so i've also muddled up 'abstract' and 'mental'.
a further, more powerful consequence of establishing these marginally physical objects is the clear rejection of ontological physicalism. If there is someone who wholds that what there is is physical and that's all there is, yet what's physical can't be said to be always physical, then physicalism is false.
28 April 2008
ontological agnosticism
given that ontological categories are not determinate, or at least not rigorous enough for us to give clear and mutually exclusive definitions of them (is a magnetic field material? are numbers purely abstract? does 'belief' transcend the mind/body dualism?), is it possible to formulate a metaontological position that defends an agnostic outlook?
allow me to clarify... some metaphysicians declare that material objects are the only kind of object. others allow for certain abstracta, but not all (such as quine and his acceptance of numbers and sets). others also infamously allow for many kinds of abstract objects and physical objects, but no mental (popper). others still barely mention the abstract or reduce it to the mental (descartes). but not many of these people give justifications for not only their ontology, but their procedures for determining their ontology.
notable exceptions include quine, who said that numbers are real because they are necessary for science to work, and carnap, who said that our ontological decisions depend heavily on a non-rigorous selection of a 'framework' which we work within. this debate in the 1950s set up the more modern field of metaontology, who have a generally positive realist camp inspired by quine, and a generally negative anti-realist camp inspired by carnap.
contemporary names in these debates include peter van inwagen (notre dame) , david chalmers (anu), amie thomasson (miami), steve yablo (mit), ted sider (nyu), and some others. there are the what some people call "hard" realists, who say that these questions are answerable and significant, there are "soft" realists who say that these questions are answerable yet trivial or unimportant, and there is only one distinguishable camp of anti-realists who deny the answerability of these questions completely.
however, shouldn't there be a middle ground position? perhaps a deflationary position that says the entire debate is shoddy, or that the questions themselves don't make any more sense? this i would characterize as a deflationary metaontology.
further, is also a position available closely akin to the position mcginn holds in mind debates: we aren't in a position to know the answers to these questions. we are epistemically handicapped in these matters. this view would be an ontological agnosticism.
[this last section is very speculative] perhaps this is why mcginn holds a view he calls 'ontological pluralism'. he sees that metaontological debates are unanswerable, he supposes that we just roll with the ontological categories we already work with: categories ranging through everyday experience: books, chairs, thoughts, beliefs, etc.
allow me to clarify... some metaphysicians declare that material objects are the only kind of object. others allow for certain abstracta, but not all (such as quine and his acceptance of numbers and sets). others also infamously allow for many kinds of abstract objects and physical objects, but no mental (popper). others still barely mention the abstract or reduce it to the mental (descartes). but not many of these people give justifications for not only their ontology, but their procedures for determining their ontology.
notable exceptions include quine, who said that numbers are real because they are necessary for science to work, and carnap, who said that our ontological decisions depend heavily on a non-rigorous selection of a 'framework' which we work within. this debate in the 1950s set up the more modern field of metaontology, who have a generally positive realist camp inspired by quine, and a generally negative anti-realist camp inspired by carnap.
contemporary names in these debates include peter van inwagen (notre dame) , david chalmers (anu), amie thomasson (miami), steve yablo (mit), ted sider (nyu), and some others. there are the what some people call "hard" realists, who say that these questions are answerable and significant, there are "soft" realists who say that these questions are answerable yet trivial or unimportant, and there is only one distinguishable camp of anti-realists who deny the answerability of these questions completely.
however, shouldn't there be a middle ground position? perhaps a deflationary position that says the entire debate is shoddy, or that the questions themselves don't make any more sense? this i would characterize as a deflationary metaontology.
further, is also a position available closely akin to the position mcginn holds in mind debates: we aren't in a position to know the answers to these questions. we are epistemically handicapped in these matters. this view would be an ontological agnosticism.
[this last section is very speculative] perhaps this is why mcginn holds a view he calls 'ontological pluralism'. he sees that metaontological debates are unanswerable, he supposes that we just roll with the ontological categories we already work with: categories ranging through everyday experience: books, chairs, thoughts, beliefs, etc.
27 April 2008
philosophy as conceptual lexicography
definition of (analytic, or, proper) philosophy:
Philosophy (n) to engage in the activity of conceptual lexicography, id est, the clarifying of conceptual muddles.
Philosophy (n) to engage in the activity of conceptual lexicography, id est, the clarifying of conceptual muddles.
mind-body dualisms
i've become increasingly convinced that reductionist materialist explanations of consciousness are inadequate. this doesn't completely put me in the cartesian camp, but i wanted to make a brief post exploring some of the options available, from least to most ontologically pluralistic.
1. Predicate Dualism - perhaps there is oen ontological category, presumably materialism, which can be characterized only through the introduction of two predicate categories. this is not to imply that these predicates correspond to different properties. these predicates are just different ways to "look at" or "talk about" one thing with really one set of properties. so "mental states" and "physical states" can still be talked about, with only one substance and one set of properties. this view is usually appealed to in lieu of reductive materialism because the reductive accounts leave explanatory gaps. fodor holds this view.
2. Property Dualism - similar, perhaps, to predicate dualism, except acknowledging that the different predicates actually do refer to different properties that one substance has. so it's still the one (once again, presumably material) thing having two levels of properties. these two types of properties are usually described as differences of process. just as the stomach is used for digestion, the brain is used for cognition. even though he tends to deny it, it seems as though this is the view searle holds. nagel holds it too.
3. Substance Dualism - then of course there's good ol' fashioned cartesianism, where the mind and the body are wholly different things. there are (at least) two different ontological categories, thus explaining succinctly and intuitively the nature of the discrepancies between the properties ascribed to mental and physical events. a contemporary proponent of this view is david chalmers.
4. Mental Agnosticism (mysterianism) - i was at first tempted to lump mysterianism along with the substance dualists, but that would be unfair. mysterians are ultimately agnostics about this kind of thing, holding that the cognitive power of the human will leave this question unanswered. we're just not smart enough to know exactly what's going on in our minds, just as chimps are just too dumb to master calculus. this is the position that mcginn holds.
the easiest out is by far the third option. it is the most intuitive and the most explanatory. however, most people nowadays don't give it much of a chance because of the heavily materialist conception of the world we live in today. personally i don't see what the big deal is to posti necessary ontological categories if we have good reason to think they're necessary. however, i can see where they're coming from as i was a strict reductive materialist until recently. over the summer i'm going to read some canonical texts in each type of dualism so i can choose which one i find most reasonable, and which is closest to experience. but before i read any of the texts, let me say that i think the most reasonable position to take, at least prima facie, is the fourth option, #4. the hard problem, as chalmers put it, really is very hard. and there doesn't seem to be a straightforward answer to it in sight.
1. Predicate Dualism - perhaps there is oen ontological category, presumably materialism, which can be characterized only through the introduction of two predicate categories. this is not to imply that these predicates correspond to different properties. these predicates are just different ways to "look at" or "talk about" one thing with really one set of properties. so "mental states" and "physical states" can still be talked about, with only one substance and one set of properties. this view is usually appealed to in lieu of reductive materialism because the reductive accounts leave explanatory gaps. fodor holds this view.
2. Property Dualism - similar, perhaps, to predicate dualism, except acknowledging that the different predicates actually do refer to different properties that one substance has. so it's still the one (once again, presumably material) thing having two levels of properties. these two types of properties are usually described as differences of process. just as the stomach is used for digestion, the brain is used for cognition. even though he tends to deny it, it seems as though this is the view searle holds. nagel holds it too.
3. Substance Dualism - then of course there's good ol' fashioned cartesianism, where the mind and the body are wholly different things. there are (at least) two different ontological categories, thus explaining succinctly and intuitively the nature of the discrepancies between the properties ascribed to mental and physical events. a contemporary proponent of this view is david chalmers.
4. Mental Agnosticism (mysterianism) - i was at first tempted to lump mysterianism along with the substance dualists, but that would be unfair. mysterians are ultimately agnostics about this kind of thing, holding that the cognitive power of the human will leave this question unanswered. we're just not smart enough to know exactly what's going on in our minds, just as chimps are just too dumb to master calculus. this is the position that mcginn holds.
the easiest out is by far the third option. it is the most intuitive and the most explanatory. however, most people nowadays don't give it much of a chance because of the heavily materialist conception of the world we live in today. personally i don't see what the big deal is to posti necessary ontological categories if we have good reason to think they're necessary. however, i can see where they're coming from as i was a strict reductive materialist until recently. over the summer i'm going to read some canonical texts in each type of dualism so i can choose which one i find most reasonable, and which is closest to experience. but before i read any of the texts, let me say that i think the most reasonable position to take, at least prima facie, is the fourth option, #4. the hard problem, as chalmers put it, really is very hard. and there doesn't seem to be a straightforward answer to it in sight.
borges & infinite monkeys
there's an interesting possibility in the field of literature that can be approached through at least two different philosophical lenses. first, let me explain the possibility, then i'll talk about two immediate problems that arise from it.
the problem i'm going to talk about is the problem of the infinite monkeys. if a group of an infinite amount of monkeys sit on typewriters randomly smacking the keyboards, eventually, all known literary works (and all future ones too) will be produced.
the same intuition is elucidated in a story by borges about an infinite library that has every combination of characters and punctuation marks possible.
from these speculations i see two philosophically interesting questions arising. the first is mostly metaphysical: what ontological status, if any, should we give to stories when, if we take this possibility seriously, all coherent works in the literature already exist in some sense or another?
the second question that arises immediately is one from authorial intent and meaning, thus becoming a question in the philosophy of language. does the intent of the author really add anything to the work produced, given that an unintelligent mechanisms could produce the same works?
these two questions require a lot of thought, but my very preliminary answers depend heavily on the plausibility of the hypothetical. obviously infinite monkeys wouldn't do the trick, but even a computer that does this task forever wouldn't have the time to contain ALL possible works of literature, considering that the human mind's language abilities are infinitely generative. take, for example, simon roberts's book titled knickers, which was unique in that chapter fourteen only says the word "thanks". chapter fourteen, btw, is from page 52 to page 2069. would a computer do that? i don't know.
if my intuition is correct, the role of authorial intent becomes of hightened importance. however, i don't think it has any effect on the ontological question.
the problem i'm going to talk about is the problem of the infinite monkeys. if a group of an infinite amount of monkeys sit on typewriters randomly smacking the keyboards, eventually, all known literary works (and all future ones too) will be produced.
the same intuition is elucidated in a story by borges about an infinite library that has every combination of characters and punctuation marks possible.
from these speculations i see two philosophically interesting questions arising. the first is mostly metaphysical: what ontological status, if any, should we give to stories when, if we take this possibility seriously, all coherent works in the literature already exist in some sense or another?
the second question that arises immediately is one from authorial intent and meaning, thus becoming a question in the philosophy of language. does the intent of the author really add anything to the work produced, given that an unintelligent mechanisms could produce the same works?
these two questions require a lot of thought, but my very preliminary answers depend heavily on the plausibility of the hypothetical. obviously infinite monkeys wouldn't do the trick, but even a computer that does this task forever wouldn't have the time to contain ALL possible works of literature, considering that the human mind's language abilities are infinitely generative. take, for example, simon roberts's book titled knickers, which was unique in that chapter fourteen only says the word "thanks". chapter fourteen, btw, is from page 52 to page 2069. would a computer do that? i don't know.
if my intuition is correct, the role of authorial intent becomes of hightened importance. however, i don't think it has any effect on the ontological question.
18 April 2008
beer tastings part 1
first try
sam adams boston lager*
guinness extra stout*
killians*
sierra nevada pale ale
getting used to it
young's double chocolate stout**
murphy's red beer
pillsner urquell*
stella artois
sam adams night
sam adams brown ale
sam adams scotch ale*
sam adams black lager
sam adams honey porter**
beerapalooza 4
czechvar
hoegaarden***
sam adams irish red
sierra nevada porter
(tentative) beerapalooza finals
young's double chocolate stout
hoegaarden
sam adams honey porter
sam adams boston lager
...
sam adams boston lager*
guinness extra stout*
killians*
sierra nevada pale ale
getting used to it
young's double chocolate stout**
murphy's red beer
pillsner urquell*
stella artois
sam adams night
sam adams brown ale
sam adams scotch ale*
sam adams black lager
sam adams honey porter**
beerapalooza 4
czechvar
hoegaarden***
sam adams irish red
sierra nevada porter
(tentative) beerapalooza finals
young's double chocolate stout
hoegaarden
sam adams honey porter
sam adams boston lager
...
10 April 2008
ppi 3
time for another post on possible post/paper ideas
- standardized measurement. what kind of metaphysical properties do standardized measurements have? is a meter stick a meter long? what kind of symbol does 'yard' entail? what about yardsticks? in these matters i'll be consulting kripke's "wittgenstien on rules and private language", wittgenstein's "philosophical investigations" and peirce's collected papers. (tags: philosophy, metaphysics, language, wittgenstein, peirce).
- objecthood and neo-meinongianism. is it plausible to posit non-existent objects in order to solve certain linguistic puzzles? that's to say, "unicorns have one horn" and "unicorns do not exist" are both true sentences? but even if we do this, it seems that we then have to turn to the problem of objecthood. is there a to clearly define some necessary and sufficient conditions for what it takes to be an object? and if so, what are they? or what might they look like? and what do do with this apparently adverse reaction from people with metaphysical distrust? (tags: philosophy, metaphysics, metaontology, language).
- evolutionary ethics. i should write a post in the metaethical strain as i did once and begin to lay some groundwork for an evolutionary constructive ethics. (tags: philosophy, metaethics, ethics).
- ethics case studies. i've been thinking about evaluating certain issues in terms of their ethical consequences. case studies might include plagiarism and/or intellectual copyright, sports and/or steroid use, etc. (tags: ethics, applied).
- existence as property. this post, if distinct from the neo-meinongianism post, would be very similar. but this post or paper would be evaluating the strictly logical thesis of getting rid of existence as an quantifier in first order logic. existence would instead be just another property. how feasible is this, and how much logic can stand without it? what, if anything, would go in its place? this post is very related to non-existent objects "being". and could branch out to very similar topics in reference and even modality (what if referring to non-existence objects is really referring to objects in other dimensions a la lewis?) (tags: logic, philosophy, language, metaphysics, metalogic, metaontology)
metametametametameta...
there's a specter haunting philosophy:
the specter of reaching inconceivable levels of meta.
the worst part: i'm not helping.
not too long ago i attended a lecture by colin mcginn titled "on the possibility of ontology." his main point was that there is no need to reduce from any of the three traditional ontological categories (i.e. physical, mental, abstract) to any other, mainly because none of the ontological categories are well-defined (or definable) anyway. so mcginn pretty much said let's leave things that "are" as just "being" and accept many things as just plain "being". that's to say: chairs are, just as beliefs are and numbers are. he dubbed this view ontological pluralism.
this position leaves some questions unclear (is this really ontological pluralism? isn't this an argument for ontological category-eliminitavism?), but in the spirit of this post, i'll leave them aside for now.
what bothers me is that, in having ontology the topic of discussion, we are engaging in the the practice of metametaphysics, as ontology is a part of metaphysics; or others have dubbed it metaontology (which 3 out of 3 surveyed found a more pleasing term). anyway, these metaontological talks have already spawned discussions about the plausibility of engaging in in such metaontological discussions, deeming them to be meaningless banter, a sort of psychobabble. this opinion, of course, spontaneously generated metametaontology, or even worse, metametametaphysics.
and i'm making all things worse because whatever level of meta these ontologists achieve, i'll always be, a fortiori one step more meta.
i guess my worry and my reason for this post is this basic pondering: are claims of this nature truth-conditional? are we even still worried about the truth at this level of meta?
the specter of reaching inconceivable levels of meta.
the worst part: i'm not helping.
not too long ago i attended a lecture by colin mcginn titled "on the possibility of ontology." his main point was that there is no need to reduce from any of the three traditional ontological categories (i.e. physical, mental, abstract) to any other, mainly because none of the ontological categories are well-defined (or definable) anyway. so mcginn pretty much said let's leave things that "are" as just "being" and accept many things as just plain "being". that's to say: chairs are, just as beliefs are and numbers are. he dubbed this view ontological pluralism.
this position leaves some questions unclear (is this really ontological pluralism? isn't this an argument for ontological category-eliminitavism?), but in the spirit of this post, i'll leave them aside for now.
what bothers me is that, in having ontology the topic of discussion, we are engaging in the the practice of metametaphysics, as ontology is a part of metaphysics; or others have dubbed it metaontology (which 3 out of 3 surveyed found a more pleasing term). anyway, these metaontological talks have already spawned discussions about the plausibility of engaging in in such metaontological discussions, deeming them to be meaningless banter, a sort of psychobabble. this opinion, of course, spontaneously generated metametaontology, or even worse, metametametaphysics.
and i'm making all things worse because whatever level of meta these ontologists achieve, i'll always be, a fortiori one step more meta.
i guess my worry and my reason for this post is this basic pondering: are claims of this nature truth-conditional? are we even still worried about the truth at this level of meta?
09 April 2008
shortlist
ignore.
terminal programs
miami
indiana-boomington
umass-amherst
cuny
yale
usc
st andrews
cornell
brown
unc-chapel hill
ucla
mit
pittsburgh
princeton
cambridge (mlitt/phd)
rutgers
non-terminal programs
houston
tufts
oxford (bphil)
terminal programs
miami
indiana-boomington
umass-amherst
cuny
yale
usc
st andrews
cornell
brown
unc-chapel hill
ucla
mit
pittsburgh
princeton
cambridge (mlitt/phd)
rutgers
non-terminal programs
houston
tufts
oxford (bphil)
08 April 2008
socrates's defense
did socrates even really try?
i mean as he is attempting to defend himself from anytus and meletus, socrates barely makes a convincing case in his own favor, and instead turns the conversation around against the meletus and accuses him of the same things he's been accused of. he doesn't give a consistent account of his own life (was he or was he not a philosopher before his friend went to go see the oracle?)
anyway, after he gets found guilty, why does he seemingly taunt the jury by suggesting his punishment should be banquets in his honor? withouth a doubt this guy was influential and lived up to very rigorous ethicals tandards, but he also should have been smart enough to save his own skin!
i mean as he is attempting to defend himself from anytus and meletus, socrates barely makes a convincing case in his own favor, and instead turns the conversation around against the meletus and accuses him of the same things he's been accused of. he doesn't give a consistent account of his own life (was he or was he not a philosopher before his friend went to go see the oracle?)
anyway, after he gets found guilty, why does he seemingly taunt the jury by suggesting his punishment should be banquets in his honor? withouth a doubt this guy was influential and lived up to very rigorous ethicals tandards, but he also should have been smart enough to save his own skin!
07 April 2008
musical meaning
what is it in a song that has the ability to bring out meaning to its listener? is there anything in the song itself that has these properties, or is it all in the mind? i don't know if it's because i'm feeling particularly emo today, but i was listening to miles davis's classic ballad "blue in green". for the purposes of the post, listen to this one, at least in part:
all music is, at least if given a materialist ontology, is a series of noises of different frequencies arranged in a particular way in space-time. but then how is it that these noises carry what we each understand to have meaning of some sort? is this meaning external or internal? or some combination of both? i guess here i'm drawing a parralel to the philosophy of language. i suspect some answer to this can be arrived at if we take some ideas from frege. however, even this approach would be highly problematicc.
in frege's discussion of language, there are generally two aspects to names: their sense (the cognitive associations and dimensions of the name) and their reference (what those names actually refer to). but of course it isn't obvious that music refers to anything at all.
i'm honestly not in the mood for even trying to solve this puzzle right now, but i hope i have the effort to one day tackle this issue with the seriousness it deserves.
all music is, at least if given a materialist ontology, is a series of noises of different frequencies arranged in a particular way in space-time. but then how is it that these noises carry what we each understand to have meaning of some sort? is this meaning external or internal? or some combination of both? i guess here i'm drawing a parralel to the philosophy of language. i suspect some answer to this can be arrived at if we take some ideas from frege. however, even this approach would be highly problematicc.
in frege's discussion of language, there are generally two aspects to names: their sense (the cognitive associations and dimensions of the name) and their reference (what those names actually refer to). but of course it isn't obvious that music refers to anything at all.
i'm honestly not in the mood for even trying to solve this puzzle right now, but i hope i have the effort to one day tackle this issue with the seriousness it deserves.
04 April 2008
rabbits in the literature
is there any interesting connection between rabbits and 20th century analytic philosophy? obviously not, but i've found 2 interesting examples of philosophy and rabbits entering the same discussion:
quine's "lo, gavagai!"- the infamous thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. here's the situation: an anthropo-linguist is placed in a foreign land with some indigenous people speaking a language he has no remote clue about. they happen to find themselves in a field. the indigenous people point in a particular direction and exclaim "Lo, gavagai!" the linguist looks towards where they're gesturing, and he sees a rabbit. does this mean the indigenous people were talking about rabbits? or were they saying 'there goes dinner'? or maybe 'the village will have good luck this year'? well quine's idea is that there is no way to know what they were talking about. it's an epistemological point, from what i can tell.
wittgenstein's "duck-rabbit" - this example of wittgenstein, used to illustrate the difference between seeing AS and seeing THAT, is so famous a brewery is named in its honor. his main philosophical point was that there are some ambiguous symbols, and images, and in these cases (which are more commonplace than one might think), we have to see "as", meaning our own perceptions are necessarily imbued with personal concepts and whims. hopefully i didn't get wittgenstein TOO horribly bad in this brief characterization, although i probably did.
quine's "lo, gavagai!"- the infamous thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. here's the situation: an anthropo-linguist is placed in a foreign land with some indigenous people speaking a language he has no remote clue about. they happen to find themselves in a field. the indigenous people point in a particular direction and exclaim "Lo, gavagai!" the linguist looks towards where they're gesturing, and he sees a rabbit. does this mean the indigenous people were talking about rabbits? or were they saying 'there goes dinner'? or maybe 'the village will have good luck this year'? well quine's idea is that there is no way to know what they were talking about. it's an epistemological point, from what i can tell.
wittgenstein's "duck-rabbit" - this example of wittgenstein, used to illustrate the difference between seeing AS and seeing THAT, is so famous a brewery is named in its honor. his main philosophical point was that there are some ambiguous symbols, and images, and in these cases (which are more commonplace than one might think), we have to see "as", meaning our own perceptions are necessarily imbued with personal concepts and whims. hopefully i didn't get wittgenstein TOO horribly bad in this brief characterization, although i probably did.
03 April 2008
on the ethics of discourse
(for the purposes of this post, i will be using a very primitive notion of right and wrong)
how okay is it to use as much rhetoric, outside of logic, in order to argue for something in the course of some discourse?
my gut reaction is to say that it's not okay at all. but there seems to be a very big difference, though, if you consider certain types of rhetorical devices (mostly the aesthetically inclined ones) than if you consider certain rhetorical methods that directly contradict logic (affirming the consequent, or whatever.)
let's take some concrete examples. using anaphora is a well known method for capturing the attention of the audience, especially if spoken. This seems harmless, and it sure does sound good.
on the other hand, affirming the consequent is a straightforwardly false in deductive logic. and unless used in a provisional and very specifically delineated discussion (where it might be justifiable under the guise of an abductive inference), it would be either a formal fallacy (to some uninformed speaker) or an intentional manipulation (where it would be used as a rhetorical device). either way, some shady stuff is going on and there very clearly see that something bad is going on here.
but even upon reconsideration of the previous example, of the aesthetically-motivated rhetoric, is there more to these devices than meets the eye? could it be that these rhetorical methods are distracting from the point of the message? in some way, is discourse supposed to be just presenting the facts in a logical manner without the hooplah and smoke and mirrors that any rhetorical device other than the clear argumentation only cold hard logic can offer?
no way, that can't be right either. i need to unstiffen my requirements for an acceptable discourse, as those aesthetically motivated rhetorical devices add a lot to some speeches, they help deliver the message more than hinder it. such as in dr. king's "i have a dream" speech, which is in english language anthologies nationwide.
could it be that any of these methods are acceptable if the GOAL of the discourse if justified, or in any case "right" by some other standard? this is a question i'll leave for another time
how okay is it to use as much rhetoric, outside of logic, in order to argue for something in the course of some discourse?
my gut reaction is to say that it's not okay at all. but there seems to be a very big difference, though, if you consider certain types of rhetorical devices (mostly the aesthetically inclined ones) than if you consider certain rhetorical methods that directly contradict logic (affirming the consequent, or whatever.)
let's take some concrete examples. using anaphora is a well known method for capturing the attention of the audience, especially if spoken. This seems harmless, and it sure does sound good.
on the other hand, affirming the consequent is a straightforwardly false in deductive logic. and unless used in a provisional and very specifically delineated discussion (where it might be justifiable under the guise of an abductive inference), it would be either a formal fallacy (to some uninformed speaker) or an intentional manipulation (where it would be used as a rhetorical device). either way, some shady stuff is going on and there very clearly see that something bad is going on here.
but even upon reconsideration of the previous example, of the aesthetically-motivated rhetoric, is there more to these devices than meets the eye? could it be that these rhetorical methods are distracting from the point of the message? in some way, is discourse supposed to be just presenting the facts in a logical manner without the hooplah and smoke and mirrors that any rhetorical device other than the clear argumentation only cold hard logic can offer?
no way, that can't be right either. i need to unstiffen my requirements for an acceptable discourse, as those aesthetically motivated rhetorical devices add a lot to some speeches, they help deliver the message more than hinder it. such as in dr. king's "i have a dream" speech, which is in english language anthologies nationwide.
could it be that any of these methods are acceptable if the GOAL of the discourse if justified, or in any case "right" by some other standard? this is a question i'll leave for another time
02 April 2008
absolutely perfect bacon grilled cheese
MATERIALS
*knife
*sourdough bread
*butter
*four slices of cheese, preferably two sharp cheddar and two muenster.
*bacon
PROCEDURES
1. gather materials
2. preheat pan on medium-low heat
3. slice the bread twice, creating two not-necessarily even slices of bread
4. prepare bacon
5. butter one side of each of those slices of bread you just made
6. put one slice BUTTER SIDE DOWN on the pan
7. quickly and carefully, put two slices of either cheese on first
8. put on top of that the already-cooked bacon
9. now the other two slices of the other kind of cheese on top of the bacon
10. put the other slice of bread, butter side up, on top of the cheese.
11. wait several minutes, untill the bottom of the cooking bread is golden brown
12. flip and wait for golden brown on the other side
13. serve with ketchup and hot sauce
sartre's 'existentialism and humanism'
The main ideas of Sartre's philosophy as expressed in "Existentialism and Humanism" can be summed up in a few basic points:
1. "Existence precedes Essence" - which is an ontological claim, that one must exist already in order to investigate the essence of that existence
2. Subject-Relative Constructive Ethics - which is a meta-ethical position, in the sense that it is a claim about ethics as a whole. There is no static, objective ethics to speak of, yet individuals have the power of creating their own ethical standards through their personal investigations of their own essence. And
3. Humanistic Marxism - which is an ethical/political position. Each individual will eventually reach conclusions, through the construction of their own ethics, approaching a humanistic Marxism. That is to say, that their ethical stances will be human-centered and equalitarian.
Each of these positions is causally independent. One can defend any of these three basic points without holding either of the other two; but Sartre combines these three to form the basic tenants of his Existentialist Philosophy. Because they're independent of each other, they can each be critiqued independently. Further, they can be critiqued in relation to each other. What I shall be doing, however, within the limited scope of this paper, is to critique at least a bit each proposition independently. I will leave the problem of their consistency untouched (although I suspect they cohere as well as Sartre would have liked).
1. 1. "Existence precedes Essence" is a quotation of Sartre's that could be taken one of two ways. It is either trivial or false. If by "existence precedes essence" he means that it is necessary for a cognizant person to be alive in order for it to investigate their own essence, then that seems to me to be a trivial point. Of course someone has to have the property of existence in order for them to have any thoughts whatsoever. However, if by this ontological claim he means to say that in order for any human being to have an essence they must first exist, I don't see how this is true. We can figure out the essence of any human being just as we figured out the essence of gold, or the essence of electricity: through scientific investigation. Gold's essence is a substance having the atomic number 79, the essence of electricity is what Einstein figured out, and the essence of Humanity is having 46 chromosomes and the only living members of the Homo genus. So to me this claim is rather nonsensical.
2. 2. Having an ethical system of subject-relative constructive ethics has many potential advantages as well as many drawbacks. If all ethics is is a series of claims reached by each individual through their own constructions, then there is obviously a sense of empowerment that each individual attains. In this sense, Sartre is very similar to Nietzsche, who would have agreed with his vision of individuals creating their own ethics. However, to me this reeks of a self-help manual more than a rigorous examination of what the true meanings of "right" and "wrong" are. IF this is all that ethics boils down to, there are no real truth values to ethical statements, only truth values as assigned by each individual. What then, if anything, do we use as a basis for grounding our morality? Do we use consensus between independently attained ethical propositions held by individuals? But then we slide back into a kind of utilitarianism that I believe Sartre wouldn't agree with either. My point here is that, as of right now, I can't make a decision as to whether I like Sartre's meta-ethics or not, but I feel that this kind of idea might as well be Dr. Phil's.
3. 3.I won't touch the third point.
So where does this leave Sartre? I don't think he's in very good shape if any of my criticisms hold.
externalism in experience/sensations
ok this is going to be really short and i hope to expand on this later, but i was thinking about externalism in sensations. here's my thought: when you feel a pain, where exactly do you feel it? many people have argued that you can only feel pain in your brain. that is, if something pinches you on the hand, you feel the pain in your brain nevertheless because that's where the c-fibers directed.
but, if you realize that each particular pain has an origin, then that origin is necessary and thus, even though the brain registers the pain, it is actually felt whereever it was actually felt.
this intuition is largely caught in a thought experiment that to my knowledge, is new. it is no doubt inspired in part by kripkenstein on other minds and mcginn on imagination, but here goes.
is it possible to imagine a pain in your knee? well, sure, you can imagine your knee being in pain, and in the simulated pain, it is your knee that has the sensation. however, can you imagine a pain in your knee in your elbow? well that doesn't really make sense. you could imagine a pain in your elbow, even a particular type of pain, the same your knee had, on your elbow (sharp vs. chronic, etc), but you can't imagine a pain in your knee in your elbow.
if i'm right about this, then particular pains have necessary origins, which lend support to an externalist account of sensation.
however, an objection quickly arises in the cases of pain in phantom limbs. i either have to come up with a pretty damn good explanation for them, or categorize them as non-legitimate pains. i tend to agree with the latter, but then i'd have o come to the conclusion that sensations of pain are not the same as pain. however, kripke himself has argued for this claim, that sensations of pain ARE pain (and the argument seems to be sound).
how to reconcile my seemingly correct previous intuition with kripke's? this'll take some time to figure out.
but, if you realize that each particular pain has an origin, then that origin is necessary and thus, even though the brain registers the pain, it is actually felt whereever it was actually felt.
this intuition is largely caught in a thought experiment that to my knowledge, is new. it is no doubt inspired in part by kripkenstein on other minds and mcginn on imagination, but here goes.
is it possible to imagine a pain in your knee? well, sure, you can imagine your knee being in pain, and in the simulated pain, it is your knee that has the sensation. however, can you imagine a pain in your knee in your elbow? well that doesn't really make sense. you could imagine a pain in your elbow, even a particular type of pain, the same your knee had, on your elbow (sharp vs. chronic, etc), but you can't imagine a pain in your knee in your elbow.
if i'm right about this, then particular pains have necessary origins, which lend support to an externalist account of sensation.
however, an objection quickly arises in the cases of pain in phantom limbs. i either have to come up with a pretty damn good explanation for them, or categorize them as non-legitimate pains. i tend to agree with the latter, but then i'd have o come to the conclusion that sensations of pain are not the same as pain. however, kripke himself has argued for this claim, that sensations of pain ARE pain (and the argument seems to be sound).
how to reconcile my seemingly correct previous intuition with kripke's? this'll take some time to figure out.
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